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Because of their behavior in negotiations from World War II through the 1960s,
the Soviets have been widely perceived in the United States as predictably
uncooperative. In the 1980's it is important to determine whether this popular image
of Soviet negotiating behavior remains consistent, or, as this thesis examines, the
possibility that there are significant variations in more recent Soviet arms control
negotiating behavior which must be recognized and addressed.
Variations in Soviet negotiating behavior may yield important insights regarding
Soviet arms control objectives. This thesis attempts, first, to produce a comprehensive
picture of post World War II Soviet negotiating behavior prior to the Limited Test
Ban Treaty negotiations. This consists of detailed analysis of specific Soviet
negotiating techniques. Through studying the frequency of Soviet use of these
techniques a comprehensive picture of what may be considered typical Soviet
negotiating behavior may be derived. What may be considered significant variations in
Soviet negotiating behavior may then be identified by applying/comparing post WWII
typical behavior with usage in subsequent negotiating encounters. Specific arms
control negotiations examined are those of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the first
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has been negotiating on arms control and disarmament with
the Soviet Union since the close of the Russian revolution in 1918, and will probably
continue to negotiate with the Soviets for many years to come. The primary objective
of this thesis is to identify variations from the historically 'typical' image of Soviet
negotiating behavior. This requires presentation of a view of 'typical' Soviet
negotiating behavior with the goal in mind of contrasting this with evidence or episodes
of 'atypical' Soviet bargaining style.
A successful negotiator must be able to persuade the other side [as well as his
own allies and sometimes even neutrals) that he believes in his own superiority.^
The Soviets are attempting to perfect this superiority. Arms control negotiations
such as the SALT talks are useful to the Soviets, regardless of what may or may not be
accomplished during those negotiations. They are used as a political tactic, by which
the Soviets are able to divert Western attention away from the real threat: the Soviet
Union's goals for promoting global communism. They tout the principle threat as that
of a nuclear holocaust, and stress that this could occur any time the Soviets Union's
interests are not taken into account.^
For the Soviets, arms control is useful only when there is a need to negotiate.
This need is not motivated by the desire to obtain treaties designed to enhance
stability or deterrence as understood by Western arms control theorists. Instead,
Soviet negotiating behavior is driven by a requirement to influence or manipulate
American military programs, gain access to technology, and so on.''
What is it that prompts the Soviets to negotiate? Part of the answer to that
question lies in the following: first, the Soviets enter talks only when they feel that
they are likely to gain something. Such an expectation is neither illogical nor
^Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s. (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1984), p. 95.
^Pipes, Richard, "Detente: Moscow's View," Soviet Strategy in Europe,
Pipes, Richard, ed.. New York: Crane, Russak, 1976.
Brian D. Dailey, "Deception and Self-Deception in Arms Control: the ABM and
Outer Space Treaties Reconsidered." Ph.D. dissertation, (University of Southern
California, 1987), 216.
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unrealistic; in fact, all negotiators approach the table with the idea of gaining
something. There are, however, two problems with this idea. One problem occurs
when a negotiator attempts to take without giving, an approach that happens to be
typically Soviet. Ideally, negotiations should be mutually beneficial. From the Soviet
standpoint, though, negotiating is a means to spread socialism and a time to make no
concessions, all the while making the proceedings as difficult as possible for those
involved. The other problem with seeing negotiations as a time to gain something for
nothing is the question of what, specifically, there is to gain. At the heart of the
problem is the fact that American and Soviet goals differ radically.
Simply identifying reasons why the Soviets wish to negotiate with the United
States on arms control issues is not enough. A more complete analysis must include
possible explanations for why the Soviets might initially propose negotiations, why
they might actually come to an agreement through the negotiations process, and
finally, why the Soviets might actually adhere to a negotiated agreement. Implications
may be derived from the identified variations, especially in respect to the degree of
Soviet interest in various arms control outcomes. This involves identifying instances of
'atypical' or 'cooperative' Soviet negotiating behavior, through the use of the
information found in the half dozen graphs displayed periodically in this thesis to help
give some clues to possible answers.'^
Although the United States has occasionally been known to use a few of the
same tactics, Soviet negotiating techniques have generally been characterized as
diametrically opposed to ours. Soviet tactics are myriad and diverse, ranging from the
psychological to the downright obvious. As a general rule, the Soviets should not be
accused of subtlety; they can, however, often be called successful. When certain
techniques fail to elicit the proper response, it appears the Soviets may learn from their
mistakes and refrain from repeated usage of those techniques deemed unsuccessful.
'^The greater proportion of information used to construct the graphs included in
this thesis is derived from Frank John Dellermann, "Soviet Negotiating Techniques in
Arms Control Negotiations with the United States". Ph.D. dissertation, (University of
Southern California, 1979). The present author has added to the original data in the
following instances: a) When research revealed that specific techniques were mentioned
by authors not cited by Dellermann; and, b) When further research of the authors that
were cited uncovered mention of specific techniques not identified by Dellermann.
Attention will not be drawn to instances where additions have been made, as this
would not appreciably enhance the main themes of this thesis.
In order to fulfill the primary objective of this thesis, a secondary objective, that
of compiling examples in a survey of Soviet negotiating techniques identified in
Western literature, is used. In studying the writings of Western authors one discovers
that there are problems of a bookkeeping nature that must be addressed. In Chapter
II, a simplified 'language' of techniques has been constructed, which will assist the
reader in readily identifying techniques when specific examples are cited throughout the
remainder of the thesis.
A review is made of the public evidence of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and
SALT I negotiating records for evidence of Soviet negotiating behavior at variance
with the model of 'typical' Soviet bargaining style. More specifically. Chapter III
covers negotiations on the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which came about for different
reasons for each of the parties involved. Regardless of the reasons, negotiations were
undertaken and continued intermittently, and at varying levels, for eight years. During
this time, the Soviets had opportunity to use their negotiating techniques, every single
one of them. After all those years, the greatest success derived by the Soviets was the
time it afforded them to catch up to and overtake United States nuclear forces and the
American technology to which they gained access.
Chapter IV deals with the first set of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. One
unsettling circumstance that led to SALT I was the Soviet development of an Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) network designed to protect Moscow from a nuclear attack.
America offered to negotiate, but it was not until we had started development of our
own ABM system that the Soviets were willing to talk. This time, however, it seems
that the Soviets had learned from their mistakes. General usage of old negotiating
techniques decreased dramatically. Certain tactics had simply lost their prior
effectiveness. Despite this phenomenon the Soviets managed to drag talks out long
enough to, once again, negotiate a treaty that was closer to what they wanted than
what we wanted.
Chiipier V begins with a comparison of the Soviet negotiating techniques utilized
during the Limited Test Ban Treaty and SALT I negotitions. Implications are derived
for United States arms control policy from conclusions regarding variations in Soviet
negotiating behavior. While evidence based on these two treaties is inconclusive, the
comparison may be used to identify Soviet negotiating trends, from which conclusions
are drawn concerning the objectives that drive the manner and methods of Soviet
negotiating behavior.
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II. SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR
This chapter concentrates on the styles and techniques the Soviets employ when
negotiating with the United States, in particular those used in negotiating on nuclear
arms control issues. The first section compares the American and Soviet approaches
and the sources from which their styles originate. It also elaborates on specific
techniques through the use of historical examples. Finally, this chapter examines the
issue of atypical negotiating behavior.
In subsequent chapters applicable examples of these Soviet negotiating
techniques are reviewed in the context of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the
SALT I agreements -- the ABiM Treaty (Chapter III) and the Interim Agreement on
strategic offensive arms (Chapter IV).
A. THE SOVIET VERSUS AMERICAN APPROACHES
Western adversaries across many negotiating tables, the Soviets are tough,
stubborn negotiators. They are confrontational and manipulative. They revel in
intimidation tactics and are unwilling to compromise. Westerners, therefore, find the
Soviets to be extremely difficult, and unpleasant to deal with in negotiations. While
Americans view any negotiation as a cooperative effort between two or more parties,
firmly believing that through reasonable negotiation a compromise can be achieved
which will be mutually beneficial to all participants. However, just as the socialist
system of the Soviet Union and the Western democratic system are incompatible, so
are their approaches to negotiation. Even before sitting down at the table, differences
are apparent.
Fred Ikle, in his book How Nations Negotiate, gives his readers a concise list of
negotiating rules which can be used as a good general outline of the American
approach to negotiation.^ They are as follows:
1. Never kill a negotiator;
2. Avoid disputes about status;
3. Adhere to agreed agenda;
4. Honor partial agreements;






8. Refrain from flagrant lies;
9. Negotiate in 'good faith';
10. Avoid emotionalism and rudeness;
11. Expedite and rationalize the negotiation process;
12. Preserve the community spirit.^
The reader will recognize in later discussion of specific negotiating techniques
that several Soviet techniques are in direct opposition to Ikle's twelve rules for
negotiating.
The 'confrontational school' of negotiation is based on the belief that an
abrasive, argumentative negotiating style designed to place the opposition on the
defensive will yield greater gains for the more agressive negotiator. True to this
method of negotiating behavior, at the ver}' root of the Soviet approach is the belief
that negotiation is a 'zero sum game'. In other words, what they are unable to gain,
we retain. In contrast, the West assumes a 'non-zero sum game', meaning, in short,
that both parties can benefit, and not necessarily at the expense of the other.
Part of the trouble is due to Americans having been brought up within a
democratic society that tends to base its values in the ethics of Christianity, ethics
which include concepts such as truth, honor, and fairness in an absolute sense. It is a
mistake for Americans to assume that they share similar morals and ethics with those
whom they choose to sit down with at the negotiating table. To assume a fair deal is
naive and gullible. Predictably, the Soviet Union not only seeks, and is able, to exploit
Western naivete, but considers exploitation of the United States' negotiating
inadequacies to be their duty.
^Mr. Ikle's set of rules, however, can also be applied to the Soviets - when used
in the negative. By exchanging the opposite meaning for the one which was intended,
one can begin to grasp the Soviet Union's negotiating mentality (ex. 1. "Never kill a
negotiator" to "Kill a negotiator"). For example, Ikle writes that in 1956 the Soviet
Military Command invited the Hungarian Minister of Defense, General Maletar, and
other delegates to "complete certain technical details of an agreement for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops." The General was actually arrested, along with the other
members of his delegation, and later killed. Ibid., p. 93.
Gerald R. Williams, "Blessed are the Peacemakers: A Lawyer Looks at
Negotiation," BYU Today, 38, 5, October 1984, p. 30.
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According to Richard Pipes, another part of the trouble is the emphasis, or lack
thereof, each of our societies places on the importance of the law in terms of adhering
to contracts and treaties.
The Western tradition derives in good part from a predominantly commercial
background of arranging treaties to the advantage of both parties. In business
dealings, it is inconceivable to have a contract benefitting entirely one side and
giving nothing to the other; all commercial contracts presuppose gains for both
parties. Hence, in all Western diplomatic negotiations, including those with the
Soviets, attempts are made to anticipate the interests of the other party and often
satisfy them in advance.^
One can readily agree with a statement, made by Colonel xMoore of the United
States Air Force, that the Soviets believe that negotiations "can, like war, be described
as a continuation of poHcy by other means''.^ Soviet sources corroborate the Colonel's
conclusion:
Supported by a profound understanding of the objective regularities of the
present epoch and guided by the principles of peaceful coexistence, socialist
diplomacy has achieved important successes in strengthening the international
position of the socialist states in the struggle against the aggressive plans and
actions of imperiahst powers in various parts of the world. ^'^
After cutting through the extraneous rhetoric to the important portions of this
Soviet statement, one can only conclude that the use of 'diplomacy', which negotiation
is a form of, is an acclaimed means of implementing their proactive commitment to
'peaceful coexistence'.^^
Richard Pipes, "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiation Styles," in Richard F.
Starr, ed.. Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1984), p. 154-155.
^Colonel William C. Moore, United States Air Force, "Some Reflections on
Negotiations," (mimeographed), p. 3.
Diplomaticheskii Slovar' . [Diplomatic Dictionary]. Vol. l,(Moscow: State
PubUshing House for PoHtical Literature, 1960), located in Committee on Government
Operations, United States Senate, The Soviet Approach to Negotiation, selected writings,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 78.
^^The Soviet definition of 'peaceful coexistence' breaks down to this: Nuclear
war between the superpowers should be avoided. It does not mean that the Soviets
will no longer attempt to spread SociaUsm throughout the world, or to support
revolutions in other countries, and it does not mean an end to the active competition
between the U.S. and USSR. In a 1960 Declaration signed by eighty-one communist
parties the concept of 'peaceful coexistence' was defined as follows: "Peaceful co-
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XIn a recent lecture given to a class studying arms control at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NTS), the Superintendent of the school, Rear Admiral Robert
Austin, related a descriptive analogy of the differences between the negotiating styles of
the Soviet Union and the United States. Admiral Austin pared down the differences to
what he called "chess versus pacman".^^ In his analogy, he stressed that due to their
closed society the Soviets (the chess players) are able to be controlled and deliberate,
able to relate every negotiating move to their intentions within the broader
international scene. Americans (the pacman players), he said, may be more apt to go
through negotiations the same way that pacman is played. America appears to
scramble and dash back and forth with no apparent concept of destination, myopically
gobbling up dots in search of any agreement that might satisfy the desires of some of
the many factions present in the open society of the United States.
According to Professor Kerry iM. Kartchner of the NTS National Security
Affairs, a major legitimate criticism of American arms control strategy is that we tend
to formulate our negotiating strategy independent of our strategic policy.^^ For
example, until the mid 1980s, the United States remained deeply committed to the
Anti-BaUistic Missile Treaty, which placed severe restrictions on the United States
abihties to deploy defenses for its strategic forces, even though these forces were
gradually becoming increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. Although
official United States deterrence policy requires survivable nuclear forces, existing
United States-Soviet arms control treaties proliibit or discourage most means of
enhancing nuclear weapon survivability. This oversight has been due in part to a
historical lack of consensus within the United States executive and legislative branches
of government as to what our arms control objectives should be.
existence of countries with different social systems does not mean conciliation of the
socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrar>', it means intensification of the
struggle of the working class, of all the communist parties, for the triumph of socialist
ideas. But ideological and political disputes must not be settled through war." Brian
Crozier, This War Called Peace. (New York: Universe Books, 1985), p. 115. Further
amplification on this topic may be obtained by studying Soviet sources.
^
^Lecture by Admiral Robert C. Austin, Seminar on Arms Control and National
Security, Naval Postgraduate School (June 1, 1987).
^
^Lecture by Kerry M. Kartchner, Seminar in Arms Control and National
Security, Naval Postgraduate School ( May 20, 1987).
14
Two of the factors contributing to this lack of governmental unity on any given
issue are differing public opinions and the opinions espoused by the press (not
necessarily the opinions of anyone other than the press). Confusing and inconvenient
as this may sometimes be, independent thought expressed through our freedom of
speech is one of the founding tenets of the American w^ay of life and should not be
compromised. The American right to independent thought is in direct contrast with
the Soviet enforcement of strict discipline, which ensures that their negotiation goals
remain consistent with those of the Soviet government and of the communist party.
B. TECHNIQUES
In order to achieve their negotiating goals, goals which are reflective of their
expansionest policy, the Soviets employ the use of specific techniques.^'* Compilation
of a list of standardized descriptions of these techniques can contribute to a more
complete understanding of Soviet negotiating behavior. This section will elaborate on
twenty-seven techniques drawn from a representative sampling of available Western
sources. These sources constitute most major Western works in English on Soviet
negotiating behavior. This thesis does not contain a comprehensive survey of all
literature available on the subject, however, the sources studied cover a complete range
of views, and represent a striking concensus of opinion on 'typical' Soviet negotiating
style. With only a few exceptions, the historical examples used are primarily obtained
from Western writings covering the time period which includes World War II until the
negotiations which led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
For example. World War II presented the United States with many opportunities
to sit down at the negotiating table with the Soviet Union. Some of these proceedings
actually occurred during World War II itself, while other, post-war negotiating subjects
related directly to the outcomes of the war. Among these negotiations were those on
Military Assistance to the Soviet Union (1943-45), Lend-Lease (1942-45), Bretton
Woods (1944), Refuges and Displaced Persons (1946), and atomic energy (1946-47).^^
Western writings on these negotiations, and others, are used in this chapter as a basis
for amplifying on Soviet negotiating behavior through the study of negotiating
techniques.
^^It is important to note that very few of these negotiating techniques have ever
been used by the United States.
^
^Further information on these, and other World War II related negotiations,
may be obtained in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., Negotiating with
the Russians. (World Peace Foundation, 1951)
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Western authors have identified numerous techniques used by the Soviets in
negotiating with the United States. More numerous than the techniques themselves,
however, are the often long and convoluted descriptions of each technique. While a
few of the techniques are referred to by most authors using the same phrasing, such as
the 'agreement in principle' technique, most of them are not identified similarly.
Without careful study, there are instances when a single technique, described by two
different writers, might appear to be two separate techniques.
Many of the better known authors have put forth greatly simplified descriptions
of certain techniques. Unfortunately, concise and apt explanations of a particular
technique have not been picked up and used by later authors writing on the same
subject. In order to simplify the language of Soviet negotiating techniques, a
compilation of techniques'^ has been used as a basis for a search of available sources
for the most concise accounts of each.
Then, from those accounts excerpts have been extracted from which phrases, and
sometimes single words, may be found that can instantly call to the reader's mind the
entire concept behind each particular technique. In those instances where good
descriptions were not readily accessable, an attempt has been made to select a word, or
phrase, which may suffice to capture the essence of a technique. The techniques
identified or discussed in the literature reviewed for this thesis includes the following,
with short titles for convenience:
15. Treasuring Of Grievances






22. Political Aspects Primary
23. Technical Information Void
24. Concession Is No Concession
25. Action
26. Quote Western Sources
27. One Stumbling Block
All of these techniques used by the Soviet Union in negotiations with the
United States have been written about by Western authors. A compilation of the first
nineteen techniques cited in the works of eighteen Western authors who have written










10 . Agreement In Principle
11 . Unreasonable Demands
12 . Tactic Of The Agenda
13 . Walk Out Threat
14 . Reversal
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A study of the following descriptions of Soviet negotiating techniques will
establish that many of these techniques may be combined with one or more of the
other techniques. In some instances the Soviet use of one technique must be preceded
by the successful utihzation of another technique, e.g., the waiving gambit (19) cannot
be used unless a successful agreement in principle (10) has been reached.
1. RUDENESS
The first of the Soviet negotiating techniques to be discussed is one which has
been used by Russians even prior to the birth of the S.oviet state - rudeness. This long
standing technique has been mentioned by nearly all authors whose writings cover the
past several decades of negotiations with the Soviets. The term rudeness does not
require explanation.
The tactic of rudeness can backfire. One instance is described by Dean Acheson,
writing about the sixth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly
(otherwise known as the "disarmament assembly"),^ ^ which opened in Paris on
November 8, 1951.
The [French President] Auriol and [Prime iMinister] Churchill speeches heightened
the sense of crisis in which to launch a serious proposal to limit and control the
arms race. Ours captured world attention as well as that of the General
Assembly. That afternoon Vishinsky made a mistake of major proportions.
From the rostrum he told the General Assembly (and the world) in a diatribe of
an hour and three-quarters that "I could hardly sleep all night last night having
read the speech [text of President Truman's "fireside chat" radio broadcast on
disarmament of the night before]. I could not sleep because I kept laughing."
The sheer bad taste of this boorish remark shocked both Assembly and press.
Speaker after speaker rose to rebuke Vishinsky and to welcome the proposal. We
wisely decided to leave that expression of outrage to others. ^^
2. PROPAGANDA
Like rudeness, using the negotiation process for propaganda purposes has been a
fundamental element of Soviet negotiating behavior since the first American
negotiating encounters with them. Through the use of propaganda the Soviets can
promote tension in the United States allies in order to bring pressure to bear for
American concessions.
Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department.
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1969), p. 578.
^^Ibid., p. 580.
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The use of propaganda, for publicity and prestige, is associated with the Soviet
Union more than with any other nation. They are highly skilled at using America's
freedom of speech against them, consistently attempting to manipulate the Western
press in order to make superficial appeals to the United States public. According to a
Soviet source:
unmasking of the aggressive plans and actions of imperialists is one of the
important methods of socialist diplomacy, assisting it to mobilize democratic
public opinion and popular masses throughout the entire world against the
aggressive policy of imperialist governments.^^
Through the use of propaganda within the context of negotiations, the Soviets
have sought to influence Western public opinion. The intentions of the Soviets in
attending ^h«^ Brest- Litovsk peace conference during the winter of 1917-1918 may be
used as an example. Leon Trotsky, then head of the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs, wrote that the Soviets:
peace negotiations in the hope of arousing the workmen's parties of Germany
and Austria-Hungary as well as those of the Entente countries. For this reason
we were obliged to delay as long as possible to give the European workmen time
to understand the main fact of the Soviet revolution itself and particularly its
peace policy. ^^
In his evaluation of bargaining behavior at Brest-Litovsk, Joseph G. Whelan
clarifies Soviet intentions.
Thus, the Bolshevik delegation rejected the traditional behavior of negotiations.
They negotiated as revolutionaries, directing their speeches not to their
negotiating adversaries across the table but to the revolutionary working classes
across their borders to Central and Western Europe.^^
3. ADVERSARIAL ATTITUDE
Today, the maintenance of an adversarial attitude by the Soviet Union toward
the United States might appear to be a foregone conclusion. During, and directly
after. World War II, however, this attitude was not automatically expected, as the
United States did not yet realize that the Soviets would remain America's ally only as
Diplomaticheskii Slovar', p. 80-81.
Joseph G. Whelan, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, The Emerging
New Contextfor U.S. Diplomacy. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 49.
^^Ibid.
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long as it suited their purposes. Frederick Osbom, in his writings concerning the early
(1946-1947) negotiations with the Soviets on atomic energy controls wrote that:
The Soviet delegate talked for times as long as any other delegate; the Soviet
delegate, and only the Soviet delegate, constantly attacked the motives of the
other delegates or their countries; when the Soviet delegate was chairman he
interfered with the discussion far more than did any other chairman, and when he
took part in the argument, did not dissociate his role as chairman from his role
as delegate.^^
In an analysis of this behavior Osbom continues:
This behavior may have resulted from ignorance; it may have been the result of a
very real and deep seated suspicion of his foreign "adversaries" (the Soviet
delegates always acted like men who were being conspired against); his
intransigence may have been the result of his own fears and sense of inferiority;
or, it may have been a studied behavior taught him in the communist schools of
diplomats, But whatever it is that makes him tick, his behavior is not of a sort to
win friends or give the impression that he is taking a serious part in a
negotiation.-^^
4. STUBBORNNESS
Stubbornness is not a trait unique to the Russians.^** However, the Soviet use of
stubbomess as a negotiating technique is unparalleled. Among those who have
mentioned Soviet negotiating stubbornness is Sidney S. Alderman, who was Assistant
to Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson while Mr. Jackson was the United States
Representative and Chief of Counsel in the Nuremberg Trial of Major European Axis
War Criminals. Alderman's war crimes negotiating overview contains the following
observation:
[The Soviets] were characteristically stubborn on any matter on which they took
a definite position or on which apparently, they were under instructions from
Moscow.. ..They could sit tight on a matter for days and weeks, remaining totally
impervious to the arguments of others. ^^
^^Osborn concluded that "at the end of the three years all of us came to believe
that we had not been negotiating, except among ourselves." in Frederick Osborn,
"Negotiating on Atomic Energy, 1947," in Dennett and Johnson, p. 233-235.
^^Estonia, presently an unwilling constituent republic of the Soviet Union, is also
a nation whose people are well noted for displays of stubbornness. It is this author's
personal observation that this trait continues to be prevalent in the offspring of those
who fled Estonia in order to retain freedom by joining the Western world.
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In an in-depth discussion of Soviet negotiating techniques, Philip E. Mosely also
discusses Soviet stubbornness and possible explanations for the frequency of displays
of this behavior by their negotiators:
During the course of negotiation it is often clear that the Soviet negotiators are
under compulsion to try for a certain number of times to secure each Soviet
point, no matter how minor. After tr}'ing up to a certain point and finding that
the demand cannot be put through the Soviet representative has often given in,
only to turn to the next item in dispute, over which a similarly prolonged period
of deadlock ensues. What is not clear, however, is whether the number or
duration of these tries has been prescribed in advance by instruction or whether it
is left to the judgement of the individual Soviet negotiator to decide when he has
built up a sufficiently impressive and protective record of having beat his head
against a stone wall, [emphasis added]
5. LIES
Most Western authors agree that the fifth technique is: be devious. 'Devious' is a
civilized word which encompasses cleverness and implies a certain amount of grudging
respect. A shorter word is more apt. Consider this example:
An American youngster is tasked with walking the family dog daily. When the
father comes home from work he asks, "Johnny, did you walk Spot today?". The boy
answers: "Yes, Dad, Spot got his walk." Actually, Johnny let Spot run in the back
yard while he was inside watching a television show. When the father discovers the
truth he does not correct the child for being devious. He punishes Johnny for lying.
In some cultures it is not the actual lie, but being caught in a lie, which is
dishonorable. To be devious is respected. But, not in America! Americans are
brought up understanding that 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' is
expected. Anything less than the truth is unacceptable, any variance of the truth
stands as a lie. Devious is a word which the Soviets would prefer that the West use for
the technique.'^ The American word is 'lie'.
^^Sidney S. Alderman, "Negotiating the Nuremberg Trial Agreements, 1945," in
Dennett and Johnson, p. 53.
^^Philip E. Mosely, "Some Techniques of Negotiation," in Dennett and Johnson,
p. 285.
^^This may also be a good example of 'semantic infiltration', which consists of
Soviet attempts to get Americans to use their phraseology in the discussion of various
conflicting issues during negotiations, so Soviet definitions of the issues will prevail. A
good example of this is the previously mentioned Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful
coexistence'. When used by the Western press as a Soviet goal, this term can be
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An example of outright lying on the part of the Soviets is recounted by John R.
Deane in his writings on negotiating military assistance to the Soviets in the early
1940's. Deane's experience was with Stalin himself:
When presenting us with his bill of goods, Stalin agreed to almost every proposal
we had made. We could have air bases; we could count on the same priority as
to use of transportation and other facilities as was given to the build-up of the
Red Army; we could have Petrokavlovsk as a naval base; we could send small
parties to survey our prospective air bases; and most important of all, we could
proceed at once with joint Soviet-American detailed planning. Looking back, it
is difficult to see how Stalin kept a straight face because the end result of the
negotiations was that the Russians got their supplies and the United States got
nothing but a belated, last minute, undesirable attack against the Japanese.^^
Frederick Osborn was the United States Deputy Representative on the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1947 through 1950. He was previously cited
in this thesis during a discussion of the Soviet adversarial negotiating attitude. Osborn
recounted that:
Throughout these three years of negotiations the Soviet delegates repeated over
and over again a few quite simple statements: "The United States refuses to agree
to the prohibition of the atomic weapon"; "The United States proposal for
control is an attempt to continue the monopoly of atomic weapons in the hands
of the United States"; "The other nations have been coerced into accepting the
United States plan"; "The Soviet Union has agreed to accept international control
and inspection." It was very obvious to anyone who listened to the debate that
none of these statements was true.^^
The Soviets do not appear to be perturbed by exposure of their blatant
falsehoods. Outright lying gives them the opportunity to gain important propaganda
objectives. Osborn continued the above discussion by noting that:
mistaken by the general public to mean that the Soviets are interested in promoting the
American concept of peace. Through 'semantic infiltration' the Soviets can link policy
goals with popular global aspirations, while simultaneously denouncing the policies of
the Western bloc, and the United States in particular, as aggressive. Further
information on this topic may be obtained in Fred Charles Ikle, "American
Shortcomings in Negotiating with Communist Powers," (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 6-8. 'Semantic infiltration' may be a separate
negotiating technique in its' own right, but is not addressed as such in this thesis.
^^John R. Deane, "Negotiating on Military Assistance, 1943-1945," in Dennett
and Johnson, p. 25.
^^Osbom, p. 233.
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These statements of the Soviet delegates were proved, and obvious, falsehoods.
But their constant reiteration had a certain effect. The delegates of the other
nations did not believe them. But after hearing them repeated in almost every
speech by the Russians or their satellites over a period of months and years, the
other delegates stopped refuting them. It was hopeless, it only prolonged the
debate, and gave the Soviet delegates renewed opportunities to repeat the
falsehood. But they still got headlines in the American and other newspapers,
and a considerable section of the American intelligentsia believed them.^^
6. DIVIDE THE OPPOSITION
The Soviets use negotiation as an instrument of policy that, in addition to
dividing United States public opinion, can promote discord and disunity among the
Western Allies. As Dean Acheson put it, in negotiating the Soviet purpose may be "to
separate allies, to undermine governments with their people, to win over uncommitted
people's"^^ or "to bring about a sense of relaxation, goodwill and security"'^^ before
mounting an offensive elsewhere. Dividing the opposition includes separating the
United States from its Western allies.
The Soviet representative was quite evidently under specific instructions both as
to what he was to say and his conduct. He was at all times to question the
motives of the others; he was to try to split the other nations apartfrom each
other, but never to conciliate the smaller nations, to whom he was always to be
arrogant and truculent; he was never, under any circumstances, to concede a
point except on specific instructions from the Kremlin, and then only in the exact
language given him; and, finally, he was to talk as much as all the others put
together, to delay, to confuse, and never to admit his true intent or to tell the
truth. The representative of the satellite was under his orders, and was to repeat
the same thing in much the same words but at somewhat less length, and with
new variations of bitterness and accusation, [emphasis added]-^^
7. NO CONCESSIONS
Americans tend to adopt a short term view and seek rapid results from the
negotiating proceedings. In so doing, the United States has bound itself with unilateral
aciions while the Soviets, who view concessions as signs of weakness and lack of
resolve, feel absolutely no obhgation to take reciprocal actions. Whelan notes that "by
^^Ibid., p. 234.
^^Dean Acheson, Sketches of Men I Have Known, (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1959, 1961),
Dean Acheson, "On Dealing with Russia: An Inside View," The New York
Times Magazine, April 12, 1959.
^^Osbom, p. 234-235.
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using an elusive and totally passive...technique of rejecting preferred proposals without
making counterproposals the Soviets can place the adversary in the position of
negotiating with himself'.^**
In 1944, Raymond F. Mikesell was a member of the technical staff at the Bretton
Woods Monetary and Financial Conference. In an analysis of overall Soviet
negotiating behavior at the conference Mikesell recalled that:
The Russians refrained from extensive debate and counter-argumentation. They
stated their proposal or objection to someone else's proposal, presented a few
simple reasons, and then countered every contrary argument by a simple
restatement of their original position. It was evident that they counted not on
logic and persuasion for winning their point but upon sheer doggedness and the
fact that they knew that the United States delegation would make every effort to
satisfy them because of the political importance of Soviet membership. By not
compromising they believed they could wring greater concessions towards their
position.-^^ [emphasis added]
8. PUPPET NEGOTIATORS
The Soviet negotiators themselves have been called "mechanical mouthpiece[s] for
views and demands formulated centrally in Moscow". ^^ The incredible staying power of
the actual negotiator at the table is a direct reflection of the Soviet government's
patient approach to gaining negotiation results. For his American counterpart the
ability to stay at the negotiating table is determined by our government, frequently in
response to the demands of an impatient American Congress.
To Westerners the Soviet negotiators appear cautious and inflexible. Their
mulish attitude can be attributed to the absolute control the Soviet Union has over its
negotiators, which allows them to make no statements that have not been previously
approved by the state. Western authors have noted that Soviet negotiators also tend
to be infuriatingly repetitious, restating positions over and over and over while they are
stalling for time awaiting further instructions from Moscow. John N. Hazard, in
writing on the Lend-Lease negotiations of 1942-1945, noted that the:
Americans felt able to make their own decisions.. .without referring the question
to higher authority. The Soviet citizens were functioning under an order from a
superior, and any deviation whatever required a conference with that superior,
^'^Whelan, p. 81.




who might or might not have to seek authority from a higher level before the
proposed plan of action could be accepted.. ..The conference was. ..only a means
of imparting to the Soviet negotiator some information to be reported by him to
his superior. Decisions had to be saved for another day.^^
Hence, Soviet negotiators may be viewed as "puppets" of the Soviet government,
as they are not given much, if any, latitude to make actual decisions within the course
of negotiations. Mosely emphasized that the Soviet negotiator was:
Not free to express concordance with any part of a proposal on which he has not
received instructions from Moscow. Even the "program statements" of Soviet
negotiators must be reviewed or written in Moscow before they can be delivered,
and therefore Soviet statements at conferences often seem to have little relation
to the immediately preceding statements of other delegations.^^
9e ALOOFNESS
Hedrick Smith, in his classic bestseller The Russians, discusses the prevalent
Russian attitude toward forming close personal relationships within the context of
being brought up in their authoritarian environment:
They conform to their surroundings, playing the roles that are expected of them.
With a kind of deliberate schizophrenia, they divide their existence into their
public lives and their private lives, and distinguish between "ofTicial" relationships
and personal relationships. ...They adopt two very different codes of behavior for
their two lives — in one, they are taciturn, hypocritical, careful, cagey, passive; in
the other, they are voluble, honest, direct, open, passionate.-^^
This honesty and openness is reserved for only a select few persons during the
average Russian's lifetime:
For safety's sake, Russians hold each other at bay. "We don't want personal
relationships with that many other people," one man said bluntly. They commit
to only a few, but cherish those.^^
^^John N. Hazard, "Negotiating Under Lend- Lease, 1942-1945," in Dennett and
Johnson, p. 234-235.
^^Mosely, p. 299.




Within this context, the West cannot condemn the Soviet negotiator for not
forming close ties with his Western counterpart. The United States must realize that
Soviet aloofness, more than simply a negotiating technique, is an integral part of their
basic personal value system. Some of the Western writers who were actual participants
in negotiations with the Soviets, however, did not feel that they personally encountered
this obstacle of aloofness. Among those writers was Sidney S. Alderman, who was
present at the 1945 negotiations concerning war crimes prosecutions. He wrote that
they: "formed very close personal attachments for each of them. [But] not one of us has
heard a word, even by indirection, from any of them since they returned behind the
"Iron Curtain.""*^ (emphasis added)
He and other Western delegates obviously felt that their Soviet counterparts were
not unapproachable during the negotiations themselves, but "very close personal
attachments" ceased to exist afterwards. This discrepancy indicates, possibly, that
those relationships were not as close as the Western negotiators believed.
10. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
Another ploy the Soviets have frequently used, usually at the start of the
negotiations process, is to make an appeal for an agreement in principle prior to any
detailed discussions. When the United States has fallen for making an agreement in
principle, the Soviets have then obdurately refused to negotiate amplifying details,
maintaining that an agreement has already been concluded. The Soviets have
successfully used this technique over and over.
Mosely noted that during the World War II timeframe the Soviets were
particularly successful with the agreement in principle technique.
One of the main pitfalls in wartime Anglo-American negotiations with the Soviet
Union was the tendency to rely upon reaching an "agreement in principle",
without spelling out in sufficient detail all the steps of its execution. After long
and strenuous debates, studded with charges, accusations and suspicions, it was
undoubtedly a great relief to reach a somewhat generally worded agreement and
to go home.. ..In this situation the Western powers sometimes gained the
"principle" of their hopes, only to fmd that "in practice" the Soviet government
continued to pursue its original aims.^^
^^Alderman, p. 53.
"^^Mosely, p. 289.
"^^In the fall of 1987 the Soviets agreed 'in principle' to the United States'
proposal for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range forces (INF),
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The agreement in principle technique, still very much in use today j"*-^ is frequently
mentioned by Western writers. In addition to supplying us with one of the
aforementioned examples of Soviet lying, Deane provides us with a specific, early
example of the successful use of the agreement in principle technique.
Molotov informed Secretary Hull that my proposals were approved "in principle"
and that details could be worked out between Soviet representatives and me after
the conclusion of the conference. Of course I thought I had achieved a
tremendous victory to win such concessions after only a few days in the Soviet
Union. My elation was short-lived because Molotov refused to allow my
proposals, or the action taken on them, to become a part of the minutes.^'*
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As Arthur H. Dean has so succinctly described the "agreement in principle" technique:
They hope for an agreement of such vagueness that they will be able to interpret
it in their own way and act to their own advantage while professing to observe
the agreement.'*^
11. UNREASONABLE DEMANDS
While use of the agreement in principle technique has been largely effective, the
use of unreasonable demands has not been. Dean Acheson had occasion to note the
attempted use of this technique by the Soviets on three separate occasions.
The first occasion occured in 1952 in conjunction with Soviet attempts to counter
Western moves aimed at ending the Berlin occupation. In 1955 they tried again, this
time in connection with the proposal for West German membership in NATO. A third
attempt, which occured in 1963 during the Limited Test Ban negotiations, will be
discussed further in the next chapter of this thesis. In writing of these three separate
episodes of the Soviet use of the unreasonable demands technique, Acheson noted that:
On all of these occasions the same clumsy diplomacy resulted: an offer to
abandon a long and bitterly held Soviet position was made on condition of allied
abandonment of its proposed innovations. When this was firmly refused, the
Soviet Union abandoned its own long-held position in the hope of dividing the
allies or seducing the Germans. ...What one may learn from these experiences is
that the Soviet authorities are not moved to agreement by negotiation -- that is,
by a series of mutual concessions calculated to move parties desiring agreement
closer to an acceptable one. Theirs is a more primitive form of political method.
prior to signing an INF agreement.
'^'^Deane, p. 6.
"^Arthur Hobson Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament: the Path of Negotiation.
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 46.
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They ding stubbornly to a position, hoping to force an opponent to accept it.
When and if action by the opponent demonstrates the Soviet position to be
untenable, they hastily abandon it — after asking and having been refused an
unwarranted price — and hastily take up a new position, which may or may not
represent a move toward greater mutual stability."^^
The use of unreasonable demands by the Soviets may also include the concept of
linkage.^^ Although linkage as an unreasonable demand has been largely unsuccessful
for the Soviets, they attempt it frequently. Linkage consists of trying to maneuver so
as to make Soviet signature of an agreement conditional upon some other topic (often
General and Complete Disarmament) wholly unrelated to the agreement. The Soviet
goal in using linkage may actually be that of gaining propaganda opportunities ~
rather than expectation that the unreasonable demand will be accepted.
12. TACTIC OF THE AGENDA
Use of the tactic of the agenda usually occurs prior to commencement of
negotiations, and includes (sometimes successful) attempts to stall actual talks by
arguing over agenda topics, agenda order and location of proposed negotiations. At
times this technique has even included arguments over seating configurations and table
shape.
In addition to elaborating on the previously mentioned Soviet use of
unreasonable demands. Dean Acheson reports on a curious occasion of Soviet use of
the tactic of the agenda.
The Russians in the past had attached importance amounting almost to mystique
to the agenda, insisting that the council could not proceed from one item to
another without reaching agreement on the item under discussion, a procedure
that was eminently adaptable to blackmail, and distorting what had seemed to be
merely clumsy EngUsh translation of agenda items into admissions and
concessions. So great was the importance attached to the formulation of the
agenda by Gromyko, Vishinsky's deputy, in preliminary conferences with Jessup
and Bohlen in the. ..Palais Rose for a proposed session of the council [a four-
power conference on Germany] in 1951 that after fifteen weeks no agenda was
agreed upon and no council was held."*^
"^^Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 274-275.
The possibility that linkage should be addressed as a separate technique is
recognized but is not treated as such in this thesis.
"^^Acheson, p. 296.
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Taken at face value this would appear to have been a successful use of the tactic
of the agenda. There was no four-power conference held, but:
In the eyes of the world it left Gromyko an unreasonable bumpkin who had
nothing to offer, wanted no meeting, and sought only to stave off all allied action
until the Kremlin could think of some new way of delaying European defense.
To prove the point the deputies offered a conference of foreign ministers without
an agenda, which Gromyko also rejected.. ..The meeting remains a puzzling
example of maladroit Soviet diplomacy."*^
13. WALK OUT THREAT
Here is another technique used by both the Soviet Union and the United States.
One form of this technique consists of threatening to walk out of talks if demands are
not met. A second form consists of an actual walk out. The walk out technique can
backfire, though for the problem lies in the danger that world public opinion (through
the media) may then condemn the nation that walks out, or even the nation that
threatens to.
There is also a third form of this technique, which consists of making
negotiations so difficult for the opponent that one forces the opposition into making a
walk out threat, or into an actual walk out.
In the following example Dean Acheson relates a course of events that occurred
during discussions in 1951 concerning Korea.^^ This is a particularly revealing account,
as it provides a glimpse of three uses of the technique: consideration of an actual walk
out and the consequent decision to attempt to force the opponent to walk out by the
United States, and fmally, an actual walk out by the Soviet Union.
Our negotiators, understandably frustrated by the endless and circuitous path
they trod, urged that we give the Communists a limited time to choose between
alternatives, and if they did not, that we break off negotiations. But we in
Washington felt that being ahead so far we must put the onus for a break
squarely on the other side. On August 20 [1951] brief hope dawned when the
Comr..unists seemed willing to consider the "line of contact" on the crucial date
rather than "the general area of the battle line" -- our phrase -- as the armistice
demarcation line. But before the significance of this phrase could be explored,
the other side broke off negotiations, charging that an American plane had
bombed and strafed Kaesong.^^
"^^Ibid., p. 555.
^°The negotiations involved the United States and both Soviet and Chinese
Communists and concerned the establishment of the 38th parallel as a line of
demarcation and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korean soil.
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14. REVERSAL
In keeping with what Americans feel to be reasonable is a belief in continuity of
position. (When the United States does change a position, the change, more often than
not, is a softening or a concession.) The Soviets, on the other hand, have no similar
reservations about reversing a prior position without explanation. Reversal entails
making a proposal, or concession, and later on retracting it. In the case of the Soviets
this is most often accomplished without any explanation of exactly why a specific
proposal or concession has been withdrawn. Alderman vividly recalls this kind of
behavior during the war crimes negotiations.
They would agree to a matter one day and repudiate the agreement the next,
evidently having communicated with Moscow in the meantime, without any
appearance of embarrassment at the inconsistency and with the blandest suavity
of manner.^^
15. TREASURING OF GRIEVANCES
Soviet negotiators accuse Americans of negotiating in bad faith. History,
however, shows that Americans stand by their word, at times to the point of
unbelievably blind adherence, while the Soviet Union has frequently taken actions in
direct violation of negotiated agreements. The Soviets appear unconcerned when
confronted with evidence of their bad faith, which may lead the West to the conclusion
that they never had any intention of honoring the agreement which they had signed.
In the following quotation iMosely discusses this treasuring of grievances, after
briefly mentioning a few of the previously covered techniques.
By far the most frequent situation is one in which the Soviet negotiators are
bound by detailed instructions rigidly pressed. Each point at issue, large or
small, then becomes a test of will and nerves. Instead of striving to reduce the
number of points of friction and to isolate and diminish the major conflicts of
interest, the Soviet negotiator often appears to his exasperated "Western"
colleague to take pride in finding the maximum number of disputes and in
dwelling on each of them to the full. Even during the wartime period of relative
cooperation it was noticeable that each decision to convene a three power
conference was followed by the piling up of disputes and grievances, as well as by





E.F. Penrose has written about the 1946 negotiations pertaining to refugees and
displaced persons. On the treasuring of grievances he elaborates:
The [Soviet] speech contained stale accusations against the British and American
military authorities which had been made much earlier, and had been investigated
thoroughly and proved to be unfounded in some cases and based on
magnification of small incidents in others.^"*
16. CONCESSION TO ENTER TALKS
Getting an opponent to make a concession for merely entering talks can be a
considerably advantageous maneuver, if the technique is used successfully. While the
negotiations process is not without cost, when compared to possible alternatives, it is
relatively inexpensive. Gaining a concession just for coming to the table is strongly
akin •o getting something for nothing. Bernhard Bechhoefer had occasion to explain
that from the Soviet perspective, the concession to enter talks technique can be
described as follows: "You (the Western powers) take action involving a concession to
us (the Soviet Union) and in return, we shall agree to talk."^^ Bechhoefer continues:
The best example of this technique in this period [arms control negotiations from
1946 to 1948] was the Soviet atomic energy proposals, which in essence provided
that if the United States and the Western powers agreed to eliminate their
nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would talk about a treaty for international
controls to assure the observance of commitments.^^
17. BAZAAR TECHNIQUE
At the outset of any negotiations, the United States prefers to present what it
feels is a reasonable position. A reasonable position from the United States standpoint
is one which usually anticipates the initial Soviet demand, and attempts to start
negotiating at what it feels should be the middle ground. In so doing America has,
therefore, already made a compromise even prior to negotiations begirming. The
Soviet Union invariably counters with what the United States feels is an unreasonable
position. In the long run, any concessions made lean in favor of the Soviets.
^"^E.F. Penrose, "Negotiating on Refugees and Displaced Persons," in Dennett
and Johnson, p. 159.
^^Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control. (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution), p. 126.
Ibid. Much more recently the reader may recall that Soviet leader Gorbachev's
"offer" in October 1987 to even attend a summit meeting with President Reagan was
conditional upon certain United States concessions involving the Strategic Defense
Initiative.
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This technique has also been referred to as 'splitting the half. In other words, if
the original American desire is for 0, and the original Soviet desire is for 100, the
United States will invariably make their starting position 50 (in anticipation of Soviet
desires). In response the Soviet Union's position will still be their desired 100.
Settlement ends up at 75, with the Soviets achieving 75% of their goal while the United
States gains only 25% of their original desires.
Premier use of the bazaar technique by a Soviet negotiator is attributed to
Maxim Litvinoff, who had a long and active career as a Soviet diplomat. Litvinoff
began his rise to preeminence in the late 1920s, held the position of Foreign Affairs
Commissar under Stalin from 1936 to 1938, and was appointed as Soviet Ambassador
to the United States in 1941. Use of the bazaar technique by Litvinoff is mentioned in
his biography by Arthur U. Pope:
Litvinoff as a full-fledged diplomat was decidely unusual. Enemies have accused
him of having brought into international negotiations the bazaar technique of
starting discussions by demanding an exorbitant price so that even with
substantial concessions he could still make a good profit.^^
Use of the bazaar technique by the Soviets may be reduced to: the making of
proposals and counterproposals that may result in a widening of the negotiable gap,
thus forcing their adversary (the United States) to compromise at some point below
that originally considered.
18. INCREASE DEMANDS
The Soviets are inclined, at times, to increase their demands. If the United States
gives in easily on a particular issue, the natural Soviet reaction will be to test the
American negotiator's resolve further. The technique of increasing demands, also
known as the "Sibylline Books" technique,^^ was used by the Soviets in negotiating
with the Finnish government during the winter of 1939-1940. Ikle recounts that when
Molotov:
Arthur Upham Pope, Maxim Litvinoff. (New York: L.B. Fischer Publishing
Corp., 1943), p. 189.
^^"This tactic was already knov^ni in ancient mythology. The prophetess Sibyl of
Cumae offered Tarquin the Proud, last of the legendary kings of Rome, nine books
containing prophecies. Tarquin thought the price so high that he refused to buy them.
Sibyl then burned three of the books and offered the remaining six at the same price.
When Tarquin refused again, she burned three more, and Tarquin, fearing that she
might destroy them all, bought the last three books at the price originally asked for the
nine." This story was recounted in Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, pp. 210-211
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Made his first peace offer, he warned the Swedish Foreign Minister who acted as
intermediary: "If these terms are not now accepted, the demands will be
increased." Two weeks later, he repeated this warning and made no concessions
at all. And when the Finnish negotiators arrived in Moscow a few days later,
new demands, indeed, were added. The Finns felt forced to accept. ^^
19. WAIVING GAMBIT
The waiving gambit is one which has been used most frequently in conjunction
with the aforementioned agreement in principle technique. This technique consists of
Soviet insistence that the United States, in signing an agreement in principle, has given
up the right to return to an issue in order to negotiate on specific details or technical
criteria, thereby settling nothing.
The "agreement in principle" approach, if successful, is often followed by the
"waiving" argument. That is, the Soviet diplomat will claim that, by not pursuing
a matter of detail or a specific point at the time when the general agreement "in
principle" was made, the diplomat "waived" it for all time.
20. TWISTING TECHNIQUE
The twisting technique may actually be looked at as a variation, or subset, of the
fifth technique discussed -- lies, and may also be connected with the "quote Western
sources" technique that is no. 26 in this survey. When the Soviets use the twisting
technique they take Western statements and alter the originally intended meaning by
quoting them out of context, or by subtly exchanging similar words that may be more
readily misconstrued for the words actually first stated. ^^
21. FULL ACCOUNT
As with the twisting technique, the full account technique may be recognized as
kin to the fifth technique of lies. In this technique, the Soviet negotiator will
steadfastly maintain that the Soviet proposal, or position, takes the opponent's
viewpoint into full account, thereby intimating fairness.
^°Dean, p. 46-47.
^^Although techniques 20 through 27 were listed as having been identified after
researching negotiations leading to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, further research
reveals that many of these techniques were previously mentioned by other Western
sources. Dellermann, p. 313-314.
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22. POLITICAL ASPECTS PRIMARY
This technique is, even more than aloofness, one which is a fundamental aspect
of the Soviet way of life. Basically the technique consists of Soviet statements that
they cannot agree to a position because their political considerations outweigh any
other possible considerations. When viewed in this manner, these may be true
statements because after all, the Soviet political purpose is well known.
To the extent that Communists take seriously a view of history according to
which their total victory' is foreordained, the attainability of any intermediate goal
toward that ultimate outcome must appear to be only a matter of time.^^
Joseph G. Whelan, in his review of the biography of Maxim Litvinov by Arthur U.
Pope, uses quotes from Litvinov's Russian biographer, Komev:
[Litvinov] explained that the Soviet diplomat tried in peacetime to perform the
tasks which the Red army would have to perform in wartime -- a reversal of the
famous sentence of Clausewitz: "War is the continuation of politics with other
means" -- that is to say, "Diplomacy is the continuation of war by other
means."^^
23. TECHNICAL INFORMATION VOID
The technique of using a technical information void means the Soviet Union
either avoids, or outright refuses, to supply the United States with technical
information vital to a round of talks. In part, such information denial is only a
reflection of the historically secretive nature of the Soviet state. There are gains,
however, that can be achieved through employing this technique.
When the Soviets create a technical information void in negotiations, the United
States rushes in to fill the gap. In this way the Soviets can discover the extent of
American advances within a particular technology without revealing how far behind, or
ahead, similar Soviet technology stands. The Soviets successfully employed this
technique in the 1958-1960 negotiations on the prevention of surprise attack.
The delegation of the Soviet bloc, amounting to forty-two experts and advisors
(as compared to one hundred and eight experts and advisors from the West),
apparently included no scientists, but consisted entirely of personnel of foreign
offices and of military establishments. During the conference, the Western
powers went ahead with the submission of their technical papers, and the Soviet




surprise attack. After all the documents were submitted, Foster [the chief of the
United States delegation] in his fmal statement commented:
The contrast between these two sets of documents is self-evident. We have
sought to promote technical discussion and understanding. You have
sought discussion of a selection of political proposals, for the most part not
susceptible of technical assessment.^'*
24. CONCESSION IS NO CONCESSION
The concession is no concession technique is similar to the previously discussed
concession to enter talks technique, in that it is also closely akin to getting something
for nothing. The Soviets tried this technique out during the meetings of the
Disarmament Commission in 1952 and 1953. When the Soviets submitted a 'new' draft
of a resolution:
Vishinsky hailed this new language as a tremendous concession to the Western
position, since the Soviet Union was now accepting "continuous" inspection"...he
declined to elaborate on the meaning of "inspection on a continuing basis" that
would not "interfere in the domestic affairs of the States." He described all
efforts to determine the meaning of his proposal as "playing at questions and
answers." He flatly declared that unless the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan
were withdrawn "there is no need for me to give any details. "^^
Later information revealed that these: "...were the same proposals the Soviet
Union itself had described as providing for periodic inspection. Therefore, the Soviet
proposals for inspection on a continuing basis were identical with the proposals for
periodic inspections."^^
25. ACTION
There is an old cliche which states that 'actions speak louder than words'. A
prime example of the use of negotiations by action by both superpowers may be
obtained by studying the events of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. On this occasion the
Soviet Union was unsuccessful at utilizing the action technique, while the United States
was successful. Whelan writes that: "as a negotiating experience, the missile crisis was




^Whelan, pp. 351-352. The significance the Cuban Missile Crisis had on other
negotiating encounters will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Khrushchev made the first move by sending the missiles to Cuba. [He]
miscalculated.. .the gravity of this action for U.S. vital interests. ..the U.S.
countermove was to establish a quarantine line around Cuba and screen the
inflow of shipping. ..[in addition] the President dispatched the reconnaissance
flights, alerted the missile forces, and prepared for air strikes against the SAM
sites as a first contingency and then, if necessary, a military invasion of Cuba.
Such moves left Khrushchev with a single choice, between war and peace. ^^
26. QUOTE WESTERN SOURCES
The quote Western sources technique can, in part, be used to gain propaganda
benefits external to the negotiations, but more importantly, it can be used wiihin actual
negotiations. When well intentioned, though misguided. Western individuals (or
organizations) publish opinions on negotiating issues, the Soviets then tout them as
representative of Western desires as a whole.
Evidence that proves that this technique has been in use for decades may be
found in Arthur U. Pope's biography of Maxim Litvinoff In March 1928, during one
of the first sessions of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, Litvinoff gave a
lengthy speech in preamble to advancing the Soviet Union's actual proposals.
Litvinoff stated that:
The Soviet delegation has had ample opportunity to convince itself that the idea
of complete disarmament has been met and accepted with enthusiasm by the
broadest masses of both hemispheres and by all progressive and peace-loving
elements in human society. The iimumerable addresses and resolutions of
sympathy from labor parties and multifarious organizations, groups and societies
from all parts of the world which I am still receiving testify, among other things,
to this. I will not take up your time by enumerating all of them, but will venture
to read only one -- a collective address I received here a few days ago, signed by
the representatives in thirteen countries of a hundred and twenty-four
organizations (chiefly women's) whose membership runs into many millions.. ..^^
This speech provides an example of the Soviet ability to pour out vacuous
verbiage. The actual communique, as quoted by Litvinoff, was as follows:
On behalf of the growing world opinion, embodied in the organization which we
represent, we gratefully welcome the courageous proposals of the Soviet
Government for complete and general disarmament.... Being convinced that these
proposals represent the will of the great mass of people in every country, who are
determined to make an end to war, and that where the will exists practical means
^^Ibid.
^^Litvuioff does not mention the name of any of the one hundred and twenty-
four organizations. Pope, p. 247.
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can be realized for giving it effect, we urge with all the strength at our command
that the members of the Commission should examine the Russian proposals with
the utmost care and with the determination to place before the International
Disarmament Conference, when it meets, some concrete scheme for the complete
disarmament of the world within a definite period of time. ^^
One can only guess at how greatly the Soviets must appreciate the opportunity
to use Western sources in support of Soviet positions in negotiating with the United
States.
27. ONLY ONE STUMBLING BLOCK
This technique consists of the Soviet negotiators emphatically stating that the
Soviet position and the American position are actually very close, that, in fact, there is
only one stumbling block which stands in the way of an agreement.
Piedictably, the one stumbling block is an American position which is non-
negotiable, based on vital national security interests. Use of this technique ties in
closely with use of the propaganda technique, in that it affords the Soviet Union with
the opportunity to present the world with a vision of the United States as the nation
standing in the way of (for instance) world peace.
On the following page a complete list of the twenty-seven techniques'^ that have
just been discussed can be found in addition to a figure that illustrates Dellermann's
research on the frequency of technique citation in Western literature.^
'""Ibid.
See Appendix A for a brief discussion of techniques not addressed specifically.
Within the scope of this thesis, the author's time constraints did not,
unfortunately, permit a complete review of all works studied by Dellermann in order to
obtain technique use frequency for #19 through #27. The authors researched by
Dellermann were: Acheson, Bechhoefer, Craig, Dean, Deane, Hayter, Hazard, Holsti,
Ikle', Kennan, Kertesz, Mosely, Nogee, Osbom, Pearson, Pipes, Steibel, and Thayer.
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Frequency of author technique citation is shown below in Figure 2.1.
SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES
oo.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
TECHNIQUES
Figure 2.1 Soviet Negotiating Techniques.
1. Rudeness 15. Treasuring Of Grievances
2. Propaganda 16. Concession To Enter Talks
3. Adversarial Attitude 17. Bazaar Technique
4. Stubbornness 18. Increase Demands
5. Lies 19. Waiving Gambit
6. Divide The Opposition 20. Twisting Technique
7. No Concessions 21. Full Account
8. Puppet Negotiators 22. Political Aspects Primary
9. Aloofness 23. Technical Information Void
10 Agreement In Principle 24. Concession Is No Concession
11 Unreasonable Demands 25. Action
12 Tactic Of The Agenda 26. Quote Western Sources
13 . Walk Out Threat 27. One Stumbling Block
14 . Reversal
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C. TYPICAL VERSUS ATYPICAL
Atypical Soviet negotiating behavior would encompass new, previously unidentified,
techniques and style. Logically, atypical negotiating behavior should also be
identifiable, in part, by a lack of, or decrease in, the usage frequency of techniques
considered "typical". Those techniques most often cited by Western authors, as
displayed in Figure 2.1, may constitute typical behavior, while those cited least often
may constitute atypical behavior. In subsequent chapters the information displayed in
Figure 2. 1 will be cross-correlated with graphs depicting frequency of techniques use in:
a) the Limited Test Ban Treaty; and, b) the SALT I negotiations. From these, relative
increases and/ or decreases in Soviet technique use can be noted.
The techniques discussed in the previous section were all identified as having
been used by the Soviets prior to the negotiations which resulted in a Limited Test Ban
TreatyJ^
While a lack of, or decrease in, usage frequency may constitute atypical behavior,
it may also reflect the Soviet's learning curve. A technique used unsuccessfully in one
set of negotiations may be used less frequently in a following encounter. Similarly,
techniques not noted for historical frequency may be used more frequently in future
negotiations, once use has proved them successful.
^^The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water.
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III. LIMITED TEST BAN
This chapter concentrates on the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water -- better known as the Limited Test Ban
Treaty. (A copy of the text of the Limited Test Ban Treaty may be found reproduced
in Appendix B.)^"* The first section includes both a brief account of events that led to
the Limited Test Ban negotiations and a review of the negotiations themselves. This
description is followed by an examination of Soviet behavior and specific techniques
used during the talks. The negotiating techniques which were used most frequently^^
are then dealt with in more depth, citing examples by such authors as United States
Ambassador Arthur H. Dean. The next section concerns apparent Soviet successes
derived through the negotiations process. Finally, discussion in the last section
includes a graph comparing the frequency of techniques used in general Soviet
negotiating behavior with those used specifically in the Limited Test negotiations, and
centers upon typical versus atypical Soviet negotiating behavior during the Limited
Test Ban Treaty talks.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY
Western authorities differ as to when the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations
began.^^ According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA),
intermittent negotiations aimed at controlling nuclear weapons testing were first
entered into in iMay 1955. The Western nations came to the negotiating table in
response to growing world concern over environmental contamination and possible
resulting genetic damage. Theories on why the Soviet Union came to the table vary,
but generally agree that environmental pollution and genetics were not foremost
concerns in the Soviet's decision to negotiate on nuclear test ban limitations.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agreements, Text and Histories of Negotiations. (Washington, D.C.:
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982), pp. 41-43. For
information on when specific nations have signed and ratified this treaty see pp. 44-47.
^^As identified by Dellermann in his study of usage frequency, pp. 316-317.
^^For instance, Dellermann indicates that the first stage of the negotiation began
in March 1957, while March 1958 is cited by Christer Jonsson in Soviet Bargaining
Behavior, The Nuclear Test Ban Case. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979),
pp. 86-87.
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In support of this conclusion is the following analysis of Soviet motivation by
Bernhard Bechhoefer:
The negotiations in the tripartite conference, however, proved that this [fear of
the consequences of excessive radiation in the atmosphere] was not a major
Soviet motivation. On April 13, 1959, President Eisenhower had suggested to
Khrushchev the immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests within the atmosphere
and under water. Such an agreement would completely eliminate the hazards of
radioactivity resulting from testing. Khrushchev,. .rejected this approach in its
entirety....^
Having concluded that environmental impact was not the Soviets' driving force,
Bechhoefer continued his analysis with a discussion of two plausible reasons for their
interest in negotiating a nuclear test ban. The first credible reason involved a Soviet
fear that chances of an outbreak of nuclear war might increase due to a rise in the
numbers of nations possessing nuclear weapons. The second possible reason
Bechhoefer offered is the Soviet desire to hinder American technological advances that
would occur with further United States testing.
Although American and Soviet reasons for negotiating may have differed, both
eventually reached the decision that it was time to begin talks. The first of the many
forums for what was to become an eight-year discussion of the test ban issue was a
subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations General
Assembly. These early talks dealt with the test ban issue within the scope of
disarmament in general, and various proposals were exchanged over the course of a
year and a half.
Two factors combined to end these lengthy talks. The first influence was the
final section of a proposal presented by the United States to the disarmament
subcommittee^^ in August 1957. The proposal read: "This working paper is offered for
negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable."^^ Among the
inseparable components of the package were "reductions in armed forces and
conventional armaments, control of objects entering outer space [and] safeguards
against surprise attack.. ."^'^ The Soviets had been expecting some Western concessions
^^Bechhoefer, p. 512.
^^Also known as the Subcommittee of Five.
^^U.N. Disarmament Commission, Subcommittee of the Disarmament
Commission, Fifth Report, Annex 5, U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/66 (Aug. 29, 1957), p. 10,
quoted in Bechhoefer, p. 408.
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at this point, yet the American package proposal contained none, and in fact made it
clear that none were forthcoming.
The second factor that lead to talks ending was the composition of the original
subcommittee, which had consisted of four Western nations ~ Canada, France, Great
Britain, and the United States — and the Soviet Union. In partial response to Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's complaints, a vote was taken within the General
Assembly to enlarge the Disarmament Commission from eleven to twenty-five
members. The resolution passed: sixty in favor, nine against, with eleven abstentions.
Those opposed to the resolution were all Soviet bloc votes, for, of the fourteen
additional nations proposed, only three were to be from the Soviet bloc. Obviously,
the addition of only three Soviet bloc participants was not satisfactory to Moscow.
In December, the 1957 disagreements over the combined issues of the
Disarmament Commission enlargement and the Western insistence on acceptance of its
proposals as a package reached a peak. Refusing to be involved in further negotiating
within either the Disarmament Commission or its subcommittee, the Soviets ended
these ultimately unproductive negotiations by walking out.^^
The years 1958 through 1960 were characterized by organizational rebuilding.
Shortly after the Soviet walk out, a series of letters and speeches were exchanged by
the Americans and the Soviets. President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles spoke
for the West, while Bulganin, Gromyko, and finally Premier Khrushchev countered
with Soviet statements. This exchange eventually led to President Eisenhower's April
28, 1958, proposal for an assembly of American and Soviet technical experts to work
on controls needed to ensure against test ban violations, a proposal that was finally
accepted by Khrushchev.
In the summer of 1958, an experts' conference convened: the Conference of
Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the
Suspension of Nuclear Tests, and on November 10, the Conference of Experts for the
Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack
began. Additionally, The United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union engaged
in a tripartite conference in October 31, 1958, that was to last until January 29, 1962:
the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The three key
concerns at this last conference were high altitude tests, underground tests, and seismic
research programs.
80Ibid.,p.AU.
^^ Ibid., pp. 424-425.
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Simultaneous with these conferences, the United States continued its research
programs.
An event that profoundly influenced the course of the negotiations. ..was the
discovery by the United States, as a result of the series of underground nuclear
explosions carried out in Nevada in the fall of 1958, that it is more difficult to
distinguish between earthquakes and explosions than had previously been
estimated.^^
The United States released this information (which was in part contrary to the
conclusions that were agreed upon during the expert's conference) to the Soviets in
January 1959. The new American data proved that a stricter control system than that
recommended by the experts was necessary to differentiate between underground
nuclear test explosions and earthquakes. The Soviets did not readily accept this
information, maintaining that the release was merely a part of an American ploy aimed
at spying on the Soviet Union.
A nuclear test ban was not the only subject of East-West dialog in the late 1950s.
The first of two important treaties that were negotiated during this time frame was the
Antarctic Treaty, signed December 1, 1959. This treaty was the first post World War
II arms control agreement, and both internationalized and demilitarized the continent
of Antarctica. This treaty also provided guidehnes for scientific research conducted in
the Antarctic and for scientific cooperation in conjunction with that research.
Reaching agreement on the Antarctic Treaty offered hope for possible future
agreement on the Test Ban issue. In August 1961, those hopes were dashed when the
Soviets announced their intention to resume atmospheric testing. Not only did they
resume testing, but rapidly embarked on the most intense series of atmospheric tests
ever conducted. The heavy Soviet testing schedule confirmed the earlier suspicions of
American negotiators that the Soviets had misused the test ban negotiations "as a
screen for test preparations".^^
The Soviet Union maintained that the West must take sole responsibility for the
Soviet test resumption. Test resumption, they said, would not have occured:
Were it not for the feverish arms build-up, increase hi military appropriations and
numerical strength of armies of the NATO countries, the transfer of their armed
forces closer to the borders of socialist states.. .the breech bolt clicking in
Berlin.. .the continuation of nuclear explosions by France, the scientific and




In response to the Soviet test resumption, the United States began testing once again
the following spring.
In November 1961, a Soviet draft agreement proposed that national systems of
detection should be used to insure compliance with a test ban.^^ This proposal, the
only one of its kind from the Soviets, was a bit ironic considering the amount of Soviet
abuse the United States was then receiving for their U-2 flights over Soviet territory
(the U-2 clearly being a part of the United States national systems of detection.)
The next organization to assume the burden of negotiating a nuclear test ban
was the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which met in Geneva and
started its meetings in March 1962. The major stumbling blocks throughout these
negotiations were similar to those that plagued the entire test ban negotiating period:
all focused on the issue of verification: on-site inspection, control posts, and the
relationship between seismic activity and underground nuclear explosions. Figure 3.1
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Figure 3.1 American/ Soviet LTBT Negotiating Differences.
^'^United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on
Disarmament, 1961. Pubn. n. 5, 1962, quoted in Dellermann, p. 256.
^^P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of Disarmament. (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1986), pp. 155-156. National systems of detection are now more commonly known as
NTM (National Technical Means). NTM includes any and all means of detection,
surveillance, etc., that a nation has at its disposal.
43
In late August 1962, Ambassador Dean -- head of the American arms control
delegation in Geneva for two years, from January 1961 through Decembei 1962 —
reached the conclusion that the Soviets would never accept any proposal for on-site
inspection, no matter how many regulations and caveats were included. Taking this
realization into consideration, Dean then offered two proposals to the Soviet delegates:
As chairman of the American delegation, I tabled at Geneva two draft treaties,
one a partial and one a comprehensive test ban, and said we were prepared to
sign the partial test-ban treaty in the three environments without inspection or
the comprehensive test-ban treaty in all four [environments] with carefully
worked-out inspection of otherwise unidentified underground seismic events.
Dean's propsal for a partial test ban was similar to the President's proposal that
was rejected by Khrushchev in April 1959, only with the addition of a third
environment, that of outer space. This time, however, the Soviets reacted with what
was interpreted as more favorable interest. The possibility exists that the Soviet Union
may have been spurred to more serious interest in actually reaching an agreement by
the resumption of United States testing five months earlier. The Soviets countered the
American proposals with a call to include underground tests in Dean's partial proposal,
without any control system,^^ a position unacceptable to the United States
The October 1962, Cuban iMissile Crisis (briefly discussed in the previous
chapter) had a profound effect on East-West relations. It brought about a desire for a
lessening of tension between the two superpowers. This confrontation showed the
Americans and the Soviets how crucial timely communication could be during a major
crisis. Dean maintains that, in his estimation, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a key
factor leading to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. (Another factor he cites
was that of the many concessions on the part of the United States, justifiable in part to
technological advances in systems for detection, identification and verification of
explosions associated with nuclear weapons tests).
The Cuban Missile Crisis also led to the second important treaty to be negotiated
during the test ban period. On June 20, 1963, the Memorandum of Understanding
Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the
Establishment of a Direct Communications Link (known more simply as the 'hot line




telegraph circuit and a secondary radio telegraph circuit, the express purpose of which
was to facilitate swift communication between the Americans and the Soviets.
On July 2, 1963, Premier Khrushchev finally announced that the Soviet Union
was ready to delink underground tests from a test ban. The Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was formally
o o
signed at Moscow August 5, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, 1963.
Ultimately, the agreement finally reached was very similar to the partial test ban
proposal offered by Dean in August 1962. At the outset the original Western intention
had been to control all nuclear weapons testing -- in the atmosphere, in outer space,
under water, and underground. However, the agreement did not eliminate
underground testing.^^ '
B. SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES USED DURING LIMITED TEST
BAN
All of the techniques discussed in the previous chapter were employed by the
Soviets during the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations. Only the ten tactics most
frequently utilized will be examined below. These techniques were, in order beginning
with the most frequently used: rudeness, no concessions, propaganda, lies, puppet
negotiators, aloofness, unreasonable demands, political aspects primary, technical
information void, and tactic of the agenda.^^
1. RUDENESS (1)
One fmds, in studying accounts of the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations, that
rudeness was still very much in evidence in Soviet negotiators strategy. Arthur H.
Dean had this to say about rudeness within the Limited Test Ban negotiations:
[The Soviet negotiator's] official stance at the negotiating table was rigid, often
rude or at least barely polite, secretive, formal, very general, and given to
diatribes and not dialogue as the safest way of dealing with almost any
question.^^ [emphasis added]
^^As of 1982, 108 nations have signed the Treaty, of which 91 have ratified it.
Radioactive debris caused by any underground tests is required to stay within
the testing country's territorial limits.
^^For continuity purposes each Limited Test Ban technique discussed in this
section will be shown with its originally assigned number.
^^Dean, p. 34.
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After nearly five decades, however, Dean noted that our negotiators had become
inured to the verbal abuse, that the Soviets' primary tactic was losing its strength:
The use of rough, impolite, and vituperative language by Soviet representatives is
a diplomatic style which communists have affected in greater or less degree from
the days of the revolution of 1917, in order to show their contempt for capitalism
and for "imperialist warmongers." It has become stereotyped. It is much like the
traffic noise that assails our ears in so many places today: it may be annoying
but does not prevent one's getting ahead with the business at hand.^^
2. NO CONCESSIONS (7)
The Soviet technique of no concessions was the second most frequently used
technique during the Limited Test Ban negotiations. The period 1958-1960 was
characteristic. Bechhoefer noted that during this time frame "the Soviet representatives
did not make even minor shifts to bridge any of the remaining gaps between the
positions."^^ Then:
Came the issue of atmospheric nuclear tests in the Spring of 1962, for example.
For the previous six months the United States had confined itself to underground
testing, although the Soviet Union had resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere
the summer before. But in March, 1962, the American government decided the
self-imposed handicap was too great, and President Kennedy announced twelve
days before the disarmament conference convened that the United States would
soon have to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere.^"^
The President followed this up with a promise that the United States would not
be forced to resume testing if the Soviet Union would sign a treaty with the
appropriate controls before the latter part of April. Here was an excellent chance for
the Soviet Union to make concessions without losing out, but "[as] it turned out, the
Soviets were far too clumsy",^^ they made no concessions and the United States was
obliged to resume atmospheric tests.
3. PROPAGANDA (2)
While Americans see negotiations as a means of working out differences and
reaching agreements -- a process to be used to facilitate compromise and settlement -





within the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations, the Soviets recognized the
propaganda values that could be achieved. In Jonsson's study of Soviet negotiating
behavior, he stated that: "disarmament proposals were seen [by the Soviets] as having
a certain value as tactical propaganda devices aimed at expediting the downfall of
imperiaUsm, while disarmament as such was not possible as long as imperialism
existed.
"^^
Although the Soviets felt that disarmament 'was not possible', they were certainly
quick to recognize the propaganda advantages to negotiating on the topic.
In 1955 and 1956 the Soviet Union followed the Western example of suggesting
individual measures of arms control to lessen tensions without relating them to
any long-range objectives. However, by 1957 the Soviet Union appreciated the
political advantages of relating its position to the ideal of a disarmed world, even
though the ideal might be unattainable. Thereafter, the Soviet approach had two
prongs. The Soviet Union in negotiations would initially advocate drastic and
comprehensive disarmament. Somewhat later the Soviet leaders would say in
effect: "if we cannot attain this drastic and comprehensive disarmament, we are
willing to go along with partial confidence-building measures in the direction of
the ultimate objective of total disarmament."^^ [emphasis added]
Agreements made in principle are usually vague statements made for political
reasons, and can be used to achieve propaganda opportunities. Due to its relationship
to propaganda it may also be important to consider Dean's assessment of the
continued Soviet use of the agreement in principle technique:
Then there is the pitfall of the "agreement in principle," which was already a
serious danger in wartime negotiations with the Soviets. Time and again.. .Soviet
negotiators will press for general agreement, often on a principle, such as being for
"peace," to which it is very difficult to object, and will charge badfaith when this is
refused. They are aware of the impatience of their Western counterparts and
seek to make agreement seem very close by stressing how easy it would be to
record it in general terms. By pushing in this way, they hope for an agreement of
such vagueness that they will be able to interpret it in their own way and act to
go







Propaganda, and its companion, agreement in principle, logically lead to the
Soviet use of lies. The reader may recall, from the second chapter, Ikle's list of twelve
rules for negotiating. In his estimation, the eighth rule -- refrain from flagrant lies -
"may be interpreted more broadly, not only as prohibiting outright lies, but as
requiring that no important facts be withheld."^^ The Soviets appear to be masters at
the art of omission.
Certainly the best example of Soviet use of this technique during talks for a
Limited Test Ban Treaty was the Soviet atmospheric test resumption. In December
1959, President Eisenhower had announced that the United States no longer felt
obligated to hold to a unilateral test moratorium. Amplifying on that idea the
President stated that "although we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons
testing, we shall not resume nuclear weapons tests without announcing our intention in
advance". ^°^
This announcement was not followed by any immediate resumption of American
testing. (In fact, the United States did not start testing again until April 1962, nearly a
year and a half later, and then only in response to Soviet tests.) The announcement
was, however, followed by many violent, public denouncements of the United States by
Soviet negotiators. The shrill criticisms of the Soviets masked their plans to do exactly
what they were declaiming: Soviet plans to resume tests were in the works. This
hypocritical Soviet reaction to the United States' announcement may have been so
vituperative because they realized that they would soon be at a public disadvantage as
world opinion might soon be condemning then for an actual test resumption.
5. PUPPET NEGOTIATORS (8)
Dean made a point of noting that the Soviet delegates negotiating the Limited
Test Ban Treaty remained, consistently, the puppets of Moscow.
That the Soviet diplomat is determined to stand by his fixed position and that he
lacks discretionary powers is certainly n^t news. One result is, of course, that he
must wait for instructions — though rarely admitting it — before he can react to a
new proposal, however logical, or suggest changes. He may, therefore, conduct
"stalling" or "longtalking" tactics which may slow up proceedings for weeks or
months. ^^^
^^Ikle, p. 107.
^^^Quoted from State Documents in Dellermann, pp. 244-245.
^^^Dean, pp. 34-35.
48
As previously cited in this section, Dean stated that Western negotiators had
become inured to Soviet rudeness. In studying Soviet negotiating throughout the test
ban talks, it also appears that the Western governments had not only grown
accustomed to puppet negotiators, but actually came to expect the long information
and decision delays caused by the Soviet delegate's wait for instructions from Moscow.
Americans came to expect delays in conjunction with the distribution of technical
information, like that obtained by the United States through research pertaining to the
series of underground nuclear test explosions conducted in late 1958. This expectation
was noted by Bernhard Bechhoeffer in the following passage:
[The] United States. ..brought the new data to the attention of the [Soviet]
negotiators on January 5, 1959. The fact that the Soviet delegation at the outset
paid no attention to this new data could be anticipated. No positive reaction by
the Soviet Union could be expected prior to the completion of the mysterious
and time-consuming bureaucratic processes of policy formation in the Kremlin,
which have never taken less than three months. ^^^
6. ALOOFNESS (9)
Characteristic Soviet aloofness was present while negotiating a Limited Test Ban
Treaty: "little or no personal relationships developed between the Soviet negotiators
and their Western counterparts."^^^ The idea developed that more informal discussions
could be important, however:
As anticipated, the "unstructured meetings, where prepared statements were not
supposed to be presented, started off with the reading by the Communist
representatives of lengthy prepared statements, of which they had a record and
we did not. Three meetings were wasted in this maimer, and the whole idea of
informal meetings fell into disrepute. ^^^
Ambassador Dean, however, noted that smaller informal meetings held by only
the co-chairmen became helpful, but only:
Because it was possible there to exchange views on a continuing basis and in an
informal way on a number of general problems beyond the immediate field of






7. UNREASONABLE DEMANDS (11)
From the previous chapter, the reader may recall Dean Acheson's description of
the use of unreasonable demands by the Soviets in 1952 and 1955. Acheson also
pointed out that the Soviets attempted to utilize the technique in 1963 during the
Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations. The unreasonable demand, Acheson said, might
just as easily be called an impossible demand. The following is one example of such an
impossible demand.
Time and again Mr. Tsarapkin declared that international control was
conceivable only within the framework of a comprehensive, permanent test ban.
Often this took the form of warnings or threats (if no comprehensive and
permanent ban, then no agreement on control). ^^^
Jonsson also noted the Soviet penchant for using the linkage form of
unreasonable demands, which is evident in the above quote. As the Soviets probably
knew beforehand. This attempt at linkage was to be unsuccessful, but would provide
them with propaganda opportunities. This next example of an unreasonable demand,
provided by Dean, shows a second unsuccessful attempt by the Soviets at the use of
linkage. Dean stated that:
Although the Soviet representatives argued strongly for some sort of commitment
on the part of the United States and Great Britain to the negotiation of a
nonaggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO powers [as a
precondition to a Limited Test Ban], this maneuver led to nothing more than a
promise on our part to consult with our allies on the subject. The subject is,
however, likely to come up again. ^^^
8. POLITICAL ASPECTS PRIMARY (22)
Dean Acheson has stated that in the traditionally Western approach "negotiation
was bargaining to achieve a mutually desired agreement [while in the Soviet approach]
it was war by political means to achieve an end unacceptable to the other side..."^^^
This Soviet primacy of political gains was evident in negotiating a test ban.
According to Ikle: "Another way of expressing firmness is to maintain that one's
position accords with legal or scientific principles.. .if you make your opponent believe





to him that your proposal is firm."^^^ This theory may also be applied to the Soviet
argumem while negotiating that their political aspects are primary: by maintaining that
the Soviet position is based solely on political principles they may be able to convince
the West that their position is politically non-negotiable. As just described, the Soviet
claim that political aspects are primary may be used within negotiations as a specific
technique. On a much broader scale, though, the political aspects to any arms control
agreement are of paramount importance to the Soviets.
In Robin Ranger's book, Arms d Politics, 1958-1978, he discussed the Soviet
predaliction for forcing political arms control agreements (as opposed to technically
limiting arms control agreements) on the West. He stated that the Limited Test Ban
was: "almost exclusively an instrument of political rather than technical arms
control."^ ^°
Motives for signing the PTB [Partial Test Ban] Treaty were political in nature:
[the Soviets] capitalized on the symbolism that had come to be attached to
nuclear testing as representing a barometer of ..strategic balance and political
relations. [The PTB] did not contain any significant contribution to limiting
subsequent advances in strategic arms competition.^ ^^
9. TECHNICAL INFORMATION VOID (23)
As mentioned earlier, after months of requests by the United States major
technical experts conferences were held during the Limited Test Ban Treaty
negotiations. However, while talks were underway, the Soviets not only failed to
supply technical information to the United States, but also steadfastly refused to accept
as valid the information that was made available by the United States. Dean stated
that he and the other negotiators:
Felt it therefore to be our particular responsibility to make certain as we could
that other nations were aware of the scientific facts involved in disarmament
problems, so that they could both understand the bases for our policies and be
better informed in the formulation of their own...Our working papers and our
statements in the verbatim records were available and did go to Moscow.
Unfortunately for the possibility of careful true dialog, there was no willingness
on the part of the Soviet government to share freely with the world the results of
its research on the scientific basis for its policies.^ ^^
^°^Ikle, p. 202.
^^"^Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics, 1758-1978, Arms Control in a Changing





10. TACTIC OF THE AGENDA (12)
Although many other techniques could be discussed within the scope of the
negotiations leading to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet use of the tactic of the
agenda will be the fmal technique addressed in this section. In the initial stage of
negotiating there was controversy over the name for the conference. While the United
States favored the term 'suspension' the Soviet Union desired the term 'cessation'.
Ultimately agreement was reached on the neutral term 'discontinuance'. ^^-^ Bemhard
Bechhoefer had occasion to note that:
The first month of meetings reproduced the by now familiar East-West debate on
agenda. The Soviet Union once again sought an agenda, the first item of which
was to prohibit nuclear tests. After agreement on the first item, under the second
item, a "protocol" could set up the international control system. This was the
familiar technique of all Soviet negotiations, asserted with slight variations, from
1946 through 1952. The prohibitions must precede the controls. The agenda
should be used to predetermine the substantive result. After a month, the Soviet
Union agreed to enter into an immediate discussion of the control system and the
conference began to discuss specific treaty provisions.^ ^'^
The Soviets also attempted to use this technique at the start of the 1958 Experts'
Conference. Ikle states that the Soviets:
Maintained that the conference should start by coming out in favor of test
cessation. As the leader of the Soviet delegation put it: "If we do not assume
that tests must and will be halted, then our work is quite fruitless." The
American scientists countered that the Experts' Conference should only examine
techniques for detecting nuclear tests without reaching a conclusion on the
desirability of test cessation. The American position won out, and the issue
whether or not tests were to be stopped was left to the political test-ban
conference.^ ^^
On the following page a list of techniques discussed in Chapter II can be found,
in addition to Figure 3.2, which illustrates the frequency of Soviet technique use while






Frequency of Soviet technique use in LTBT is shown below in Figure 3.2.
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10. Agreement In Principle
11. Unreasonable Demands
12. Tactic Of The Agenda
13. Walk Out Threat
14. Reversal
15. Treasuring Of Grievances






22. Political Aspects Primar>'
23. Technical Information Void
24. Concession Is No Concession
25. Action
26. Quote Western Sources
27. One Stumbling Block
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C. SOVIET LIMITED TEST BAN SUCCESSES
Why did the Soviets finally agree to a test ban so similar to the one they turned
down in 1959? Many of the years spent negotiating a Limited Test Ban Treaty were
characterized by a Soviet holding pattern, one long stall for time.
Soviet Union rejected a three-environment treaty ban from 1958-1961 because it
preferred an unpoliced moratorium that would minimize the cost of its
resumption of atmospheric testing.
During their intense atmospheric testing schedule the Soviets learned nearly all
they needed to about the atmospheric effects of nuclear weapons detonations.
Additionally, reaching an agreement was not in their political interests to negotiate an
agreement for a nuclear weapons test ban until after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Politically the crisis emphasized the Soviet Union's need to consolidate its
position and to secure recognition of its right as a global superpower to compete
with the United States beyond their most immediate areas of interest. This
necessitated a re-examination of the existing understandings about the nature of
superpower rivalry and the means for controlling it. Such control would have to
be political, and therefore would involve political, not technical, arms control.^
It may be surmised that once the Soviet Union felt it had surpassed the United
States in obtaining technical information from their intensive series of atmospheric
tests they were ready to negotiate in earnest, in order to halt the United States testing
that would inevitably bring further American nuclear weapons advances. The treaty
that the Soviets wanted to sign was a treaty that was primarily political, a treaty
without controls, and that the treaty they got.
There are varying reasons as to why a nation might choose to adhere to the
terms of a treaty once it has been signed and ratified. Chief among one list of these
reasons is the fear of punishment for non-compliance. At the top end of the scale
punishment could mean military retaliation (of differing degrees). Lesser forms of
punishment could include sanctions such as embargoes. Other explanations for why
nations might comply with treaty terms are: a sense of the rational; the hope of
providing predictability; and even a realization that at some point in the future other
nations will be less motivated to negotiate an agreement with a lawbreaker.^ ^^ These
^^^Ranger, p. 65.
^^''ibid., p. 55.
^^^David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics, 3rd ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 159-161.
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general explanations may be applicable to many nations, but do not necessarily apply
to the Soviet Union.
In January and October 1984 and February, June, and December 1985, President
Reagan issued reports to Congress and the public that the Soviets had violated -
or had probably violated - virtually every modern nuclear (and chemical-
biological) weapons arms control agreement, including the Limited Test Ban
Treaty ofl963...^^^
On the following page a complete list of the twenty-seven techniques discussed in
chapter II can be found, in addition to Figure 3.3., which is a comparison of the
information displayed in Figure 2.1 (author citation frequency) and Figure 3.2 (Limited
Test Ban Treaty technique frequency).
^^^William R. Van Cleave, and S.T. Cohen, eds., Nuclear Weapons, Policies, and
the Test Ban Issue. (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. ix.
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Figure 3.3 Author Citation vs LTBT Technique Frequency.
1. Rudeness 15. Treasuring Of Grievances
2. Propaganda 16. Concession To Enter Talks
3. Adversarial Attitude 17. Bazaar Technique
4. Stubbornness 18. Increase Demands
5. Lies 19. Waiving Gambit
6. Divide The Opposition 20. Twisting Technique
7. No Concessions 21. Full Account
8. Puppet Negotiators 22. Political Aspects Primary
9. Aloofness 23. Technical Information Void
10. Agreement In Principle 24. Concession Is No Concession
11. Unreasonable Demands 25. Action
12. Tactic Of The Agenda 26. Quote Western Sources
13. Walk Out Threat 27. One Stumbling Block
14. Reversal
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D. TYPICAL VERSUS ATYPICAL SOVIET LIMITED TEST BAN BEHAVIOR
In studying Figure 3.2 the reader may note that overall, Soviet negotiating
behavior remained fairly typical. A large proportion of the Soviet favored techniques
during the Limited Test Ban talks were also the techniques most frequently cited by
Western authors in the previous chapter, indicating typical behavior. While this is the
case, however, it is also true that a few of the more well known techniques were used
less frequently during the Limited Test Ban negotiations, and a few of the less well
known techniques were used with more frequency, indicating a certain amount of
atypical Soviet negotiating behavior as well.
While Figure 3.3. shows all of the relative rises and falls for each technique, it
may be important to call attention to a few of the more significant changes, as well as
a few of the more significant consistences.
1. The primary Soviet negotiating technique identified by Western authors prior to
the Limited Test Ban was rudeness (1). The technique of rudeness remained popular
with Soviet negotiators during discussions on a test ban. Typical.
2. While previously not cited nearly as often by Western authors, the no concessions
(7) technique was used by the Soviets as frequently as was rudeness. Atypical.
3. Political aspects primary (22), technical information void (23), and the twisting
technique (20), all relatively unheard of prior to negotiating a test ban, were used
extensively. Atypical.
4. Limited Test Ban usage of the bazaar technique (17) and increase demands (18)
remained low — one time only for each -- consistent with the low rate of usage
previously identified by Western authors. Typical.
5. While negotiating on the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Soviet attempts to obtain an
agreement in principle (10) were not overly prevalent. Use of its follow-on technique,
the waiving gambit (19) did rise (from 12.5% to 50% relative to agreement in principle
use). Atypical.
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\IV. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT I)
This chapter concentrates on the SALT I Treaties -- The Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (known as the ABiM Treaty) and the
Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (known as the Interim Agreement). (A copy of the SALT I ABM
Treaty and of the Interim Agreement are reproduced in Appendices C and D.)^^^ The
format of this chapter follows the same basic outline as that of the previous chanter.
The first section contains a brief account of events which led to the SALT I
negotiations, followed by a review of the main issues in the negotiations themselves.
Next will be an examination of Soviet behavior and specific techniques used during the
talks. The negotiating techniques which were used most frequently ^^'^ are then dealt
with in more depth, citing examples by such authors as Raymond Garthoff, John
Newhouse, and Ambassador Gerard C. Smith. The next section concerns apparent
Soviet successes derived through the negotiations process. The final section includes a
graph that compares the author citation from Chapter II with that of SALT I
technique frequency, followed by discussion on typical versus atypical Soviet
negotiating behavior during the SALT I talks.
A. SALT I HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Soviets began to place a limited ABM network around Moscow in 1964.
They maintained that, due to its purely defensive nature, the system was not as
destabilizing as offensive strategic forces were. This position was reafiirmed in 1967 by
Premier Kosygin, who was widely reported as saying that: "an anti missile system may
cost more than an offensive one but it is intended not for killing people but for saving
lives. "^^^
^^^ACDA, pp. 139-142 and 150-152 respectively. Information on agreed
statements, common understandings, unilateral statements and Protocols to both the
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement may be located on pp. 143-147 and 153-157
respectively.
As identified by Dellermann in his study of usage frequency, pp. 472-473.
^^^Ranger, p. 154.
58
Taken at face value, the Soviet position that defense was better than offense
might appear both logical and valid. From the United States' perspective, however, it
was neither. The ABM system would give the Soviet Union both a strong strategic
offense and defense, while America would be left with only offensive nuclear forces. If
the Soviet Union could defend itself from a strategic nuclear attack while the United
States could not defend itself, what incentive would the Soviets have not to attack the
United States? Installation of the Moscow ABM system was, therefore, an extremely
destabilizing move on the part of the Soviets.
Understandably, the United States wanted to negotiate limitations on defensive
strategic weapons as soon as possible, and informed the Soviets of such. Faced with a
lack of response from the Soviet Union, and after a great deal of internal negotiating,
the United States devoted itself to development of its own ABM defense system. This
decision did help provoke a Soviet response: they signalled that they were willing to
negotiate on both offense and defense.
The fact that the United States seemed to be moving closer toward both ABM
and MIRV [Multiple, Independently targeted Reentry Vehicle] capabilities while
the Soviet Union itself had as yet only an inadequate ABM system and no
MIRV at all, probably provided a strong incentive for Soviet readiness to begin
strategic arms talks: to try to keep the United States from widening the
advantages it might derive from these two salient strategic technologies.^
Talks that would have started in the Autumn of 1968, if the Soviets had not
decide to invade Czechoslovakia in August, began in December 1969. Despite Soviet
assurances to the contrary prior to the start of actual negotiating: "inhibiting offense,
not defense was to be a hard Russian position for the next two and one-half years."^^"*
The SALT I negotiating timetable is much more clear cut than that of the
negotiations on a Limited Test Ban Treaty. As can be seen from examining the
schedule of the actual talks in Figure 4.1 on the following page, the formal negotiating
sessions were interspersed with three other meetings, the last of which was a summit
meeting between President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev.^^^
Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979), p. 8.
^^"^John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: the Story ofSALT. (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1973), p. 90.
^^^Information used in Figure 4.1 was derived from Wolfe, p. 227.
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SESSION PARTICIPANTS DATES
1. Helsinki Delegations Nov-Dec 1969
2. Vienna Delegations Apr-Aug 1970
3. Helsinki Delegations Nov-Dec 1970
Washington Kissinger/ Dobrynin Jan 1971
4. Vienna Delegations Mar-Mav 1971
5. Helsinki Delegations Jul-Sep 1971
6. Vienna Delegations Nov 7l-Feb 72
7. Helsinki Delegations Mar-May 1972
Moscow Kissinger/Brezhnev Apr 1972
Moscow NixonjBrezhnev May 1972
Figure 4.1 SALT I Negotiating Timetable.
Due to the availability of such a precise negotiating schedule, the detail required
in discussing the Limited Test Ban in Chapter 3 will not be necessary in this Chapter.
A discussion of relevant issues, however, is important.
The SALT I talks produced the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, two
distinctly separate accords. The first placed limits on strategic defense while the other
put constraints on ICBMs and SLBMs. The ABM Treaty limited each nation to two
ABM systems apiece, one for defense of the nation's capital and one for defense of an
ICBM field. (This was changed in 1974 to one system apiece, either a nation's capital
or one of its ICBM fields.)
The offensive limits codified in the Interim Agreement covered both land and sea-
based strategic missile launchers, as well as nuclear submarines.
Figure 4.2^^^ shows the ICBM and SLBM force levels agreed to in the protocol
to the Interim Agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union at the conclusion
of SALT I.
1 ^A
The information in Figure 4.2 is taken from Ranger, p. 158. Acronyms used
in Figure 4.2 are: ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), SLBM (Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile), SSBN (Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear), Hotel
(H)-Class Submarine (NATO designation for a first-generation Soviet nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine carrying 3 SLBMs, first deployed in 1960. 10 H-class
submarines were deployed during SALT I), and SS-7/SS-8 (NATO designation for first-
generation Soviet ICBMs which were deployed in the early 1960s. 209 SS-7s and SS-8s
were operational during the SALT I). All acronym definitions from Gerard C. Smith,
Doubletalk, The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. (New York:
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Figure 4.2 SALT I Offensive Strategic Force Limits,
The two agreements that comprise SALT I were signed at Moscow on May 26,
1972, and entered into force October 3, \912P'^
B. SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES USED DURING SALT I
During SALT I the Soviets utilized three negotiating techniques that were not
identified earlier in this thesis: back channel and eleventh hour negotiating, and cherry
picking. ^^^
As a Soviet negotiating technique, cherry picking^^^ consists of attempts to pick
only certain portions out of package proposals, leaving behind the portions that the
Soviets cannot make work to their advantage. Cherry picking was a technique that
American negotiators were on the look-out for during the SALT I talks, for many of
^^^Two other treaties were negotiated in conjunction with SALT I. On
September 30, 1971, during session 5 of SALT I, the Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics To Improve the USA-
USSR Direct Communications Link was signed. Made possible by advances in satellite
technology, it replaced the antiquated wire telegraph circuit with two satellite
communication circuits. On June 22, 1973, the Agreement Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear
War was signed. This treaty was a commitment to consult in the event that either
nation came to feel that a real danger of nuclear war was eminent.
^^^These are probably not new Soviet techniques, but simply techniques that
went relatively unrecognized prior to SALT I.
^^^Also known as taking the raisons out of the cake.
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the United States package proposals contained items that were not necessarily
beneficial to the nation if disconnected from the whole.
Eleventh hour negotiating is negotiating while already knowing when an
agreement must be reached. John Newhouse, the SALT I historian handpicked by
Kissinger, wrote that:
Negotiating against a deadline is always risky. But by arranging to sign a SALT
agreement in Moscow, that is what Nixon elected to do. In effect, he placed
himself in what French diplomats call the worst of positions: demandeur. It is
hard for the other side to react to a self-anointed demandeur other than to exploit
him. Yet, as it turned out, nobody seems to have been exploited. Brezhnev
wanted, and apparently felt that he needed, the agreements as much as NLxon.^^^
Back channel negotiating is a technique that consists of behind the scenes
negotiating that is conducted simultaneously with, but entirely separate from, the
formal negotiating sessions. The technique is highly controversial. Some SALT I
analysts, such as historian John Newhouse, have written that the back channel
negotiating that occurred was not detrimental.
SALT was well served by the NLxon- Kissinger system, which is suited to
problems of surpassing sensitivity and long lead time. The back channel is a
good place for dealing with rival powers, but allies, like bureaucrats, resent being
left out....^^^
On the other hand, there are also strong proponents, such as SALT I Executive
Officer and Senior Advisor Raymond Garthoff, of the conclusion that the back channel
negotiating that occured during SALT I can be "characterized as hectic, confused, and
not successful in gaining [any] real [United States] objectives''.^-'^
Many of the techniques used during the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations
were used during the SALT I talks. Beginning with the one utilized most often, the
most frequently used techniques will be discussed below: divide the opposition,
stubbornness, propaganda, no concessions, action, rudeness, adversarial attitude,
concession to enter talks, lies, and agreement in principle. ^'•^
^^^Newhouse, John, "Cold Dawn: the Story of SALT", in Haley, P. Edward,
Keithly, David iM., and Merritt, Jack, ed.. Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the
Future. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 212.
'^Ubid,
^
•'^Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons Learned
from SALT", {International Security. Vol. I, Spring 1977), p. 16.
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1. DIVIDE THE OPPOSITION (6)
During SALT I, one of the main negotiating goals of the Soviet Union appears
to have been that of separating the United States from its NATO allies. This Soviet
goal, however, was not realized, according to Leon Sloss, during:
The SALT negotiations there was a good deal of consultation with allies. Their
interests were expected to be affected by limits on U.S. strategic forces, by the
level ofABM deployments, and, even more directly, by the provisions relating to
forward-based systems and the transfer of technology that the Soviets attempted
' to include. ^^'^
Gerard Smith, who, as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under
President Nixon, was assigned as Chairman of the American SALT I delegation,
recalled that:
Certainly [the Soviets] appreciated the potentially divisive effect on our North
Atlantic and Pacific allies to this claim to include U.S. aircraft committed to
forward defense and to exclude the Soviet missiles threatening Western Europe
and the Far East. But if this was the Soviet motivation it was frustrated. For
over two and a half years we kept in close consultation with our allies, briefmg
them during each of the seven SALT rounds, and usually before and after. The
Allies were briefed twenty-two times in all. FBS [Forward Based Systems]
naturally was the issue in which they took the most interest, and our discussing it
frequently and frankly seemed to give confidence to the allies that their most
immediate interests were being protected. ^^^
The Western European nations' initial fears that their interests would not be
considered in discussions involving only the two superpowers were put to rest, for try
as they might, the Soviets were unable to divide in order to conquer during the SALT I
talks.
^^^Similar to the previous chapter, for continuity purposes each SALT I
technique discussed in this section will be shown with its originally assigned number.
As will later be seen in studying Figure 4.2, the techniques of lies and agreement in
principle were used as frequently as three additional techniques. This author chose to
include the first two (over unreasonable demands, political aspects primary, and one .
stumbling block) because they were the two most often previously cited by Western
authors.
^^^Leon Sloss, "Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union:
Introduction and Findings", in Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, eds., A Game for High
Stakes, Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union. (Cambridge,




Stubbornness, a long-standing Soviet negotiating technique, is a technique that
can be highly successful if employed correctly. It can wear down the opponent to the
point where he will concede on the issue out of sheer frustration.
Patience and firmness are necessary virtues in negotiation, but unproductive,
indiscriminate or unduly protracted obstinacy in not. Controlled flexibility is
necessary.. ..It is, in short, necessary to be able to discriminate between patience
and obstinacy, firmness and flexibility, and to know when and how to use
each.^^^
The Soviets were well known for their characteristic stubbornness during SALT I.
General Edward L. Rowny (ret.), who was the Ambassador who represented the Joint
Chiefs of Staff during the SALT I talks, noted that: "Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet
negotiator in SALT...showed almost no flexibility in the negotiations". ...^-^^ As
previously mentioned in the historical section of this Chapter, inhibiting offense, not
defense, was to be a firm Soviet negotiating position right up until the start of formal
negotiating sessions.
The Soviets never did consent to negotiate the phased destruction of B-47s and
TU-16s [American and Soviet bomber aircraft], and for two years, they
steadfastly refused to negotiate any freeze on strategic weapons systems. ^^
3. PROPAGANDA (2)
Once again the Soviets came to the negotiating table with the idea of using the
proceedings as a means of advancing their socialist goals. According to John
Newhouse, in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) the Soviets not only used
negotiations to "buy time, becloud the issue, and acquire propaganda [advantages,
thereby gaining] political leverage". ^^^^ (emphasis added)
Due to the extreme secrecy of the SALT I negotiations, however, the
opportunities for Soviet propaganda gains were not available to the extent that they




^^^Newhouse, in Haley, p. 211.
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Throughout, there was a remarkable absence of intrusion of extraneous
ideologizing and propaganda. This stands hi marked contrast to the experience
of most earlier post-war negotiations with the Soviet Union. The confidentiaUty
of the negotiations clearly contributed to this approach in SALT.^
While secrecy precluded extensive Soviet propaganda gains in the pubhc arena, it
left open the opportunity to use Western statements to their advantage while at the
negotiating table. This was evident:
During the latter half of 1970 and the first half of 1971, [when] it became
increasingly clear that the United States was gradually disengaging from its own
NCA [National Command Authority] proposal, and was attempting to gain the
right to salvage as much as possible of the Safeguard ABM deployment in
defense of the minuteman ICBM which was slowly proceeding against a
considerable opposition in the US Senate. The American Delegation increasingly
argued the merits of ICBM defense on grounds of enhancing strategic
survivability and stability, whereas the Soviets could -- and did -- simply play
back our own arguments of 1970 in support of limitation only to an NCA
authority. ^'^^
4. NO CONCESSIONS (7)
Soviet unwillingness to make concessions was quite apparent during the SALT I
talks. At tunes this unwillingness worked to the Soviet advantage, while at other times
the result was a reciprocal United States unwillingness to make concessions. In 1970,
the Americans made concessions when they dropped MIRV limitations and offensive
force reductions from their proposals. These concessions were not met with
concessions by the Soviet Union.
When the American August 4 proposal neither became a basis for possible
agreement nor led to a Soviet alternative proposal (except to suggest an initial
agreement only limiting ABM systems), we dug in.^'^^
In an interview, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who acted as Kissinger's advisor during
high-level SALT related conferences with the Soviets, described the Soviet attitude
toward making concessions:
As negotiators, the Soviets are "tenacious." Usually, they begin a negotiation,
Sonnenfeldt recalled, by taking a very firm position and putting the burden of





position. They say, in effect, "this is our position; of course, we are willing to
hear yours, and so on... they yield points rather grudgingly," ^'^^
When, after an extended period of no concessions, the Soviets do yield a point
they seem to expect greater Western concessions in return. "They resort to a tactic of
dramatizing their concession. They use their own readiness to compromise on a
particular point to extract a greater compromise from the other side in return, [and] try
to make you awfully grateful for what they have done."^"*** (emphasis added)
5. ACTION (25)
Negotiating by action, while comparatively neglected during the Limited Test
Ban talks, was highly prevalent during SALT L The following example illustrates to
what lengths the Soviet were willing to go in order to communicate with the United
States using actions (in this case slowing or speeding their ICBiM buid-up) to back up
their words.
The Soviet Union displayed a subtle use of military programs for signaling in the
SALT I negotiation. After SALT began in November 1969, the previous rapid
ICBM buildup ceased; additional groups of ICBiM launchers were begun for
nearly a year. At the time, as the talks began to stalemate in late 1970, a new
signal was made by the initiation of eighty new launchers. Again, following the
May 20, 1971, agreement (but not as a part of it) the Soviet Union unilaterally
refrained from hiitiating any additional new ICBM launchers. Thus in the two
and a half years of negotiation of SALT I only eighty Soviet ICBMs were added,
in contrast to 650 in the preceding two and a half years. ^"^^
It may be conjectured that the Soviets felt that this seemingly responsible
behavior on their part would give the appearance of negotiating sincerity. This type of
broad scale negotiating by action was augmented by Soviet use of the same technique
on a narrower scale. The Soviets were given the opportunity to demonstrate this more
limited approach when: "two U.S. Army Generals, Scherrer and McQuarrie, flying a
light plane from Turkey, inadvertently crossed the Soviet border in bad weather and






The day of the next plenary, the entire American delegation was invited to a
Soviet reception commemorating the October Revolution. The generals were still
being detained. To demonstrate feelings about the incident, the American
presence was minimal, a fact quickly noted by the Soviet hosts. An American
officer asked his Soviet counterpart how they could expect us to be voluntary'
guests when our countr\'men were being detained involuntarily. One Soviet said
the generals' case was indirectly related to SALT. They would not have crossed
the Soviet border had the United States not had forward bases in Turkey.^"*^
Four days after the reception the generals were released. Although it did the
Soviets no good on the issue, it is very possible General Scherrer and General
iMcQuarrie were detained in the Soviet Union in order to stress Soviet FBS
objectives. ^"^^
During SALT I, negotiating by action was not unique to the Soviets. The
United States took advantage of the action technique in order to speed the Soviet
decision making process.
There is little doubt that Kissinger's first China trip and Nixon's commitment to
go himself aroused Breshnev to hasten the sluggish pace of his detente diplomacy.
Few concepts are more detested in Moscow than that of a multipolar world.^'*^
6. RUDENESS (1)
Rudeness was used during SALT L Those who were there noted that, compared
with previous experiences, there was a decrease in usage by the Soviet delegates,
relative to evidence that the Soviet negotiators were emulating the more civilized
Western negotiating manners.
With respect to Soviet negotiating behavior, the SALT I experience revealed a
significant distinction: the emergence of elements of traditionahsm in negotiations
at the SALT delegation level,^^^
More social behavior on the part of the Soviet delegates was: "in contrast to a
continuation of the crude 'shock tactics' at the highest political level reminiscent of the
past." Soviet leadership used rudeness during talks with President Nixon, who








Everyone was "in a good humor" when they returned to the dacha from a boat
ride on the xVIoskva River, but for the next 3 hours as the two negotiating teams
sat facing each other, the Soviet leaders... "pounded me bitterly and emotionally
about Vietnam."^^^
7. ADVERSARIAL ATTITUDE (3)
In conjunction with rudeness the unpleasant Soviet technique of maintaining an
adversarial attitude was evident during the SALT I talks. Whelan, after interviewing
Ambassador Beam, wrote that: [Beam] found them "competent negotiators" but
"always unpleasant, mostly unpleasant." [They] "antagonize you right away when they
start out; then try to put you on the defensive right away."^^^
In the past the Soviets' adversarial attitude has been excused, partially, because
of the well known Soviet fear of foreigners on their soil. General Rowny brings up an
interesting point that leads one to the conclusion that the well-publicized historical
image of a continually besieged Soviet state should not be given too much
consideration.
Granted, the Soviets have been invaded by the Tartars, the Poles, the Swedes, the
French, and the Germans. But they themselves have invaded the Crimea,
Finland, Siberia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Afghanistan, to name a few. The record is mixed. On the one hand, they do
have a defensive attitude and do remember being invaded. On the other hand,
they did not come to occupy one-sixth of the world's space simply by being
invaded. ^^"^
8. CONCESSION TO ENTER TALKS (16)
In Chapter II use of the Soviet concession to enter talks technique was described
as remarkably similar to trying to get something for nothing. Two instances of Soviet
attempts at receiving American concessions for agreeing to discuss a subject during
SALT I are discussed below by Dellermann:
The Soviets at first refused to discuss SLBM [Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missiles] launchers, but added that if they were to be discussed the USSR must
be allowed more launchers than the United States. It was clear that this was a
precondition for any negotiations on SLBMs.^^^
^^^Ibid., p. SOX.
^^^Edward L. Rowny, "Ten Commandments for Negotiating with the Soviet




That the Soviets used lies and deceit while negotiating on SALT I was
unmistakable. The United States attitude toward this type of negotiating behavior is,
first of all, disbelief, as Americans tend to assume honesty long before they look, for
dishonesty. Second, Americans react with condemnation, when they realize once again
that they have been mislead.
The issue of the Soviet attitude toward morality is a controversial one... [They]
would rather lie and cheat than be accused of stupidity. The Soviets view
negotiation as a competition and will take advantage of any loopholes that we
are shortsighted enough to allow them. They do not consider this sort of
behavior to be lying or cheating. Their approach to morality is different from
ours. Whatever they do as a service to their country they consider to be morally
irreproachable.^^^
According to Paul Nitze, who was a member of the United States SALT
delegation, the Soviets negotiated this way during SALT L The following quote is
important, for in addition to illustrating Soviet underhandedness, it provides a good
example of the type of proposals provided by the Soviet Union throughout the SALT I
negotiations.
The ABM agreement says that in addition to the ABM components that they can
have in a circle around Moscow and in one missile defense field, they can have a
limited number ofABM components at test ranges for the purposes of tests at
existing ranges... Then we tried to get an agreement from them as to exactly
what those existing test ranges were. We drafted a statement saying our ABM
test ranges were at Kwajalein and at White Sands. We understood their was at
Shari Shagan. They did not disagree but said they would prefer to put in a
parallel statement. In that statement that said they agreed that national
technical means of verification are adequate to determine where existing test
ranges are, et cetera. Then, much later, they claimed that all along Kamchatka
had been an additional testing range on their side. Subsequently I understand
they have claimed all test ranges, whether they be tank test ranges or anything
else, can be ABM test ranges; therefore, they could have 15 ABM's on any one
of an infinite number of test ranges. We told them the way we interpreted the
treaty language. They didn't tell us they had a different interpretation. Then
they claimed that the language of their unilateral statement does not specifically
say that they had only one ABM test range at Shari Shagan.
When recalling this Soviet proposal Nitze concluded that if [that isn't negotiating




10. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE (10)
The now familiar Soviet technique of insisting on an agreement in principle was
used during the SALT I talks.
It called for limitations on strategic offensive armaments, defined as those
capable of striking targets within the territory of the other side, regardless of
where those armaments were deployed. Forward-based delivery systems in a
geographic position to strike such targets should be destroyed or moved out of
range. An unspecified total should be established for land-based ICBM
launchers, ballistic missile launchers on nuclear submarines, and strategic
bombers. Replacement of units of one type by those of another type would not
be permitted. The production (but not the testing) of multiple warheads of any
kind and their installation in missiles would be banned. Limitations would be
placed on ABM launchers and certain associated radars. Verification would be
by National Technical Means only. No on-site inspection. ^^^
Ambassador Smith •wTote to the President and informed him that this particular
document was essentially political in nature. Permitted levels for offensive systems
were not specified. The Soviets never budged from the position that numbers would be
disclosed and discussed only after agreement on principles. ^^^ When the West does
succumb to the temptation of signing an agreement in principle, the United States
adheres not only to the letter, but the spirit of the law. Western expectations that the
Soviets will do likewise are unrealistic.
This general approach to agreements is one reason why the concept of acting in
the spirit of an agreement is not part of the Soviet practice; if a given point is not
in the text of the agreement, to follow it nonetheless is an unmerited bonus to
Western participants. ^^"^
On the following page a complete list of the twenty-seven techniques discussed in
chapter II can be found, in addition to Figure 4.3., which illustrates Dellermann's
research on the frequency of Soviet technique use while negotiating on SALT I.
^^^Smith, pp. 123-124.
^^^Smith, p. 124.
^^^Jonathan Dean, "East-West Arms Control Negotiations, The Multilateral
Dimension", in Sloss and Davis, p. 85.
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Figure 4.3 Soviet Negotiating Techniques Used in SALT L
1. Rudeness 15. Treasuring Of Grievances
2. Propaganda 16. Concession To Enter Talks
3. Adversarial Attitude 17. Bazaar Technique
4. Stubbornness 18. Increase Demands
5. Lies 19. Waiving Gambit
6. Divide The Opposition 20. Twisting Technique
7. No Concessions 21. Full Account
8. Puppet Negotiators 22. Political Aspects Primary
9. Aloofness 23. Technical Information Void
10. Agreement In Principle 24. Concession Is No Concession
11. Unreasonable Demands 25. Action
12. Tactic Of The Agenda 26. Quote Western Sources
13. Walk Out Threat 27. One Stumbling Block
14. Reversal
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\C. SOVIET SALT NEGOTIATING SUCCESSES
In studying negotiating successes, one must first examine the goals of those
negotiations. United States objectives were: to deter attacks on the United States and
its Allies; to defend the United States and its Allies should such deterrence fail, and to
achieve arms control and crisis stabihty.
[The Soviets] wanted an agreement that would stop the U.S. ABM program, with
its potential for triggering a full-scale ABiM competition, and one that would
register American acceptance of strategic parity. They wanted an agreement
permitting deployment of a new generation of ICBMs that we later learned they
were developing. And they wanted no inspection in the Soviet Union. Added
targets of opportunity were U.S. bases in Europe and the Far East and a long-
shot possibility of halting or slowing up U.S. MIRV deployments. ^^^
During SALT I, the United States negotiated based on an American conception
that stability was the shared goal and strategic balance was desired between the United
States and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union rejected the United States concepts and
countered with their own "equality and equal security" needs, which superficially
sounded similar to American ideas, but were not. What "equality and equal security"
meant in Soviet terms was that they were entitled to compensation for the United
States advantages of geographic locale, technological strength, and alliance
relationships. ^^^
The Soviets' basic approach during SALT I differed significantly from the basic
American approach. This demand provides an excellent example of the Soviet ability
to cloud an issue during the negotiation process.
The Soviets wanted an overreaching, general, politically meaningful accord; we
stressed concrete militarily meaningful arms control...The Soviet
approach.. .aimed at general American acceptance of the rough strategic parity
that had been achieved, and at a more general restraint on military buildup while
accenting political detente. ^^^
Indirectly, the Soviets achieved successes by using negotiating techniques that
helped them to stall for time during the course of SALT negotiations. A full-scale
ABM program would have protected Soviet industry and citizenry. A full-scale ABM
^^^Smith, p. 125.
Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating From Strength, Leverage in U.S.-Soviet Arms
Control Negotiations. (New York" Praeger Publishing, 1985), p. 36.
^^^Garthoff, pp. 5-6.
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program, however, was not what was allowed by SALT I; what the United States
thought was agreed to appeared to correspond to the American concept of mutual
vulnerability, under which two (later one) ABM systems per nation were acceptable.
On the surface, such an arrangement would appear to have been made in good faith,
suggesting mutual trust. The Soviets used the time bought during the treaty to move
three quarters of all their new industry out to the small and medium-sized towns. This
is known as protection by dispersal. ^^^ Further, stalling for time allowed for the
education of the Soviet civilian population in civil defense measures. Dispersal and
civil defense education have done essentially the same as what an ABM defense system
would have done — protect Soviet industry and citizenry. Such actions tend to negate
any initial trust we may have felt in entering into a defense restrictive treaty.
It is logical to believe the Soviets will accept agreements only if they calculate
that they will be better off, or at least no worse off, than they would be in the absence
of mutual constraints. With this idea in mind, when can the United States reasonably
expect concessions from the Soviets? According to Robert Einhorn,^^^ the United
States may get what appear to be Soviet concessions:
1. When they have encountered technological difficulties in producing a certain
weapon;
2. When the United States holds the technological edge;
3. When the weapons system being limited has reached the end of its useful
lifetime; or
4. When the limits imposed are close to planned Soviet goals anyway.
The primary question, in any one of these cases, is whether or not these are truly
concessions. Concessions or not, all four of Mr. Einhom's points have been confirmed
by the results of SALT L
In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was not interested in limitations on an Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system. Mr. Einhom's first two points were illustrated
when a United States nationwide ABM defense system appeared to become not only
feasible, but a new and challenging technological threat to the Soviets, as they were
unable to produce a superior, or even qualitatively equal system. Once Congress had
approved the deployment of an ABM system and the Soviet Union felt that its national
^^'^Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente", in Edward
P. Haley, David M. Keithly, and Jack Merritt, eds., Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control,
and the Future. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 249.
^^^Einhom, p. 40.
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\security interests were threatened, they stopped dragging their feet in the SALT I talks
and pushed for an agreement which suited their purposes. What the Soviets got was a
nice, vague agreement which they could, and do, violate.
An example of Mr. Einhom's third instance also occurred in SALT L What
appeared at the time to be concessions made by the Soviets were actually cases
confirming the use of the "end of useful lifetime" tactic. The Soviets allowed SS7's and
SS8's to be limited because they were reaching the end of their useful lifetimes.
The fourth situation to bring about Soviet concessions was also in evidence
during the SALT I negotiations. It may be hypothesized that goals and limits planned
by the Soviet Union coincided neatly with the limits which they allowed to be placed
on ballistic missile launchers in the SALT I negotiations. It was, therefore, more than
agreeable to them.
When SALT I got underway, the primary purpose of the United States was to
bring about an arms control agreement that would limit strategic forces so that neither
the Soviet Union nor the United States could launch a 'knock-out blow' against the
other's strategic deterrent. To Americans, the Soviets did not appear cooperative in
the negotiating process. How, therefore, could the United States hope for meaningful
results from the SALT talks?
The United States wanted to limit offensive strategic weapons in SALT I, and did
manage to obtain the Interim Agreement. The ABM Treaty, placing limits on
defensive strategic weapons, came out much closer to what the Soviets wanted than to
what America wanted.
On the following page a complete list of the twenty-seven techniques discussed in
chapter II can be found, in addition to Figure 4.4., which is a comparison of the
information displayed in Figure 2.1 (author citation frequency) and Figure 4.2 (SALT I
technique frequency).
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Author citation vs SALT I technique frequency is shown below in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 Author Citation vs SALT I Technique Frequency.
L Rudeness 15. Treasuring Of Grievances
2. Propaganda 16. Concession To Enter Talks
3, Adversarial Attitude 17. Bazaar Technique
4. Stubbornness 18. Increase Demands
5. Lies 19. Waiving Gambit
6. Divide The Opposition 20. Twisting Technique
7. No Concessions 21. Full Account
8. Puppet Negotiators 22. Political Aspects Primary
9. Aloofness 23. Technical Information Void
10. Agreement In Principle 24. Concession Is No Concession
11. Unreasonable Demands 25. Action
12. Tactic Of The Agenda 26. Quote Western Sources
13. Walk Out Threat 27. One Stumbling Block
14. Reversal
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\D. TYPICAL VERSUS ATYPICAL SOVIET SALT I NEGOTIATING
BEHAVIOR
In studying Figure 4.4, it may be noted tliat a substantial portion of the Soviet
favored techniques during SALT I were also the techniques most frequently cited by
Western authors regarding Soviet behavior in earlier negotiations. Despite this
similarity, Soviet negotiating behavior during SALT I appears to have been atypical
when comparing technique frequency with historical expectation: overall Soviet
technique usage was remarkably low. On the basis of the sources reviewed, over half
of the techniques were used either only once, or not at all.
1. Eight of the ten most used SALT I techniques were in the author's top ten.
Rudeness (1), propaganda (2), adversarial attitude (3), stubborness (4), lies (5), divide
the opposition (6), no concessions (7), and agreement in principle (10).
2. Two of the most frequently used SALT I techniques, action (25) and concession
to enter talks (16), were not primary in past Western writings.
3. The four techniques not utilized at all during SALT I were: the walk out threat
(13); treasuring of grievances (15); increase demands (18); and full account (21).
Atypical.
4. An additional ten techniques were used only once, puppet negotiators (8),
aloofness (9), tactic of the agenda (12), reversal (14), bazaar technique (17), waiving
gambit (19), twisting technique (20), technical information void (23), and quote
Western sources (26). Atypical.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. LIMITED TEST BAN AND SALT I: POSSIBLE TRENDS
This study is, as was noted at the outset, based on a survey of several of the
more authoritative Western discussions of Soviet negotiating behavior in arms
control -- and on specific accounts of the LTBT and SALT I. On the basis of these
sources, author technique frequency depicted in Figure 2.1 was compared first with
technique frequency during the Limited Test Ban (Figure 3.3), and second with usage
during SALT I (Figure 4.4). The fmal comparison that is made in this thesis is that of
Soviet technique usage during the Limited Test Ban versus Soviet technique usage
during SALT I (Figure 5.1).










10. Agreement In Principle
11. Unreasonable Demands
12. Tactic Of The Agenda
13. Walk Out Threat
14. Reversal
15. Treasuring Of Grievances






22. Political Aspects Primary
23. Technical Information Void
24. Concession Is No Concession
25. Action
26. Quote Western Sources
27. One Stumbling Block
In studying Figure 5.1, one can quickly see that the overall picture of Soviet
negotiating technique use dropped considerably, in fact, by nearly half A fifty percent
reduction in technique use makes rises in any singular category that much more
significant. It seems that the Soviets are still fine-tuning their negotiating techniques
through a trial and error method, in which we are the Americans are the guinea pigs.
1. Rudeness (1) was identified as the primary Soviet negotiating technique both prior
to, and during, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. During SALT I the use of rudeness
dropped considerably (although the technique did remain among those most frequently
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Figure 5.1 LTBT vs SALT I Negotiating Technique Comparison.
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inefTectiveness during test ban talks: to American negotiators Soviet rudeness had
become commonplace. This decrease may indicate atypical Soviet negotiating
behavior. On the other hand, the decrease in rudeness may reflect an upward swing of
the Soviet learning curve.
Four techniques stand out due to increased usage during SALT I. Dividing the
opposition tops the hst, followed by stubbornness, action, and concession to enter
talks.
2. Stubbomess (4) rose slightly, reflecting the Soviet waiting game, as they may feel
they have plenty of time considering their ideological belief in the inevitable and
ultimate victory of communism.
3. Divide the opposition (6) rose to be most frequently used technique during SALT
L This rise may be indicative of increasing Soviet interest in separating the United
States from its Western European NATO partners. This concept coincides with the
judgement that: "[t]he first priority of Soviet policy in Europe has been to safeguard
the USSR's territorial and political gains in World War IL"^^^
The Soviet approach to arms control seems to have been opportunistic and
adaptive rather than uniformly coherent. The historical record suggests
nonetheless that the USSR has attempted to use arms control to degrade the
credibility of United States nuclear guarantees to Western Europe; to encourage
Western self-restraint; to promote disunity in the Atlantic Alliance; to deny
fallback options to Western Europe; to place the USSR in a better position for
the contingency of war; and to advance the long-standing Soviet goal of an "all-
European" collective security system that excludes the United States. ^^^
4. Soviet use of the concession to enter talks (16) technique increased by 50%. When
comparing use during the Limited Test Ban and SALT I, the rise of this tactic may
reflect the Soviet belief that they may be more successful with their repeated attempts
to get something for nothing.
5. Based on the souces reviewed, the use of the action (25) technique by the Soviets
doubled during SALT L Possibly the Soviets have had to increase their use of this
technique, as the United States may no longer so gullible as to believe everything the
Soviets say.




\6. Five Soviet negotiating techniques that decreased by 50% or greater during SALT
I were: lies (5); no concessions (7); unreasonable demands 11); reversal (14); and
political aspects primary (22).
7. There were six SALT I Soviet negotiating techniques that decreased to one time
only usage: puppet negotiators (8); aloofness (9); tactic of the agenda (12); twisting
technique (20); technical information void (23); and concession is no concession (24).
8. During SALT I, four Soviet negotiating techniques that were used both prior to
and during the Limited Test Ban, were not used at all. Those techniques that did not
appear at all were: the walk out threat (13); treasuring of grievances (15); increase
demands (18); and full account (21). '
B. SOVIET NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES
For numerous reasons, the Soviets are interested in negotiating on arms control.
One primary reason is to use arms control as a process to impose limits on United
States defense expenditures and on specific force programs, in order to be able to know
in advance where, and where not, to counter the United States by allocating limited
Soviet defense monies.
Another reason the Soviets seek to negotiate arms control with us is to achieve
constraints on new United States military developments in order to forestall future
competition which could be detrimental to the Soviet Union. The Soviets do not want
the United States to come up with any qualitatively new and challenging threats. If we
do, they seek to ban them. Interestingly, one of the most powerful United States
negotiating leverage tools derives from this Soviet interest in a total ban of potentially
dangerous American capability. Such leverage, however, may drop off rapidly if
America is not prepared to accept a total ban. When the Soviets fail to close off an
unpromising channel of competition with the United States through negotiation, they
recognize that their comparative advantage is in quantity, not quality. In consequence,
they are likely to be relaxed about, or even opposed to, limits on the particular
systems. For the Soviets the critical threshold may be zero.
Americans assume arms control negotiating is a process aimed at cooperation,
undertaken in order to reach common goals. In this assumption, however, Americans
may well be mistaken, for 'cooperative', does not seem to be in the Soviet vocabulary.
Propaganda, semantic infiltration, and agreements in principle are a small sampling of
Soviet tactics, all of which further Soviet goals. During negotiations, Soviet goals
consist of taking all they can get while giving as little as possible in return. Such a
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system is not readily compatible with the American approach to negotiating. At times,
however, concessions are made, concessions that are reached mainly when the Soviets
realize that they might be in a losing situation anyway. The Soviet negotiating style is
consistently self-serving. In studying the Limited Test Ban Treaty and SALT I
negotiations and their outcome, it is clear that the negotiating tactics employed by the
Soviets, were, for the most part, employed successfully.
Contrary to a popular belief that arms control will solve the differences between
the United States and the Soviet Union, differences that contribute to the arms race,
the process of arms control should not be viewed as an ultimate goal. In and of
themselves, negotiations on arms control will not bring about a lasting or worldwide
relaxation of Soviet ambitions.
Agreeing to a treaty and actually honoring that treaty are two very different
things. So far as successful negotiating is concerned, one cannot necessarily measure it
by what is ultimately agreed upon on paper. Success should also consider the actual
outcome, what takes place when the ink is dry, when the negotiators pack their bags
and return home. The nations making an agreement are expecting each other to live
up to the agreement. Like the chain that is only as strong as its weakest link, so is a
treaty only as good as those who uphold it. The Soviet Union must bear the
responsibility for the weakest link, consisting of broken promises.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The analysis in this thesis indicates that further research of Soviet negotiating
behavior is warranted. In order to determine additional Soviet negotiating trends the
methodology used in this thesis on Western negotiating experiences with the Soviets
through SALT I may be applied to subsequent negotiating encounters.
Additional study should also uncover patterns of instances when the United
States effectively countered Soviet negotiating techniques. These patterns, in
combination with results from the research of possible means of recognizing Soviet
negotiating techniques at the time of use, may result in an enhanced United States
ability to develop Specific counter-techniques. Further research in these areas would




ADDITIONAL SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES
There are five other Soviet negotiating techniques that are not addressed
separately in this thesis. Two of these additional techniques are covered in Chapter II:
semantic infiltration and linkage. Semantic infiltration is discussed in a footnote to
technique no. 5, lies, and linkage is included as an element of technique no. 11,
unreasonable demands. Three more techniques are examined at the beginning of the
techniques section of Chapter IV: back channel negotiating, eleventh hour negotiating,











10. Agreement In Principle
11. Unreasonable Demands
12. Tactic Of The Agenda
13. Walk Out Threat
14. Reversal
15. Treasuring Of Grievances






22. Political Aspects Primary
23. Technical Information Void
24. Concession Is No Concession
25. Action
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TREATY BANNIiNG NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER
Signed at Moscow August 5, 1963
Ratification advised bv U.S. Senate September 24, 1963
Ratified by U.S. President October 7, 1963
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow October 10, 1963
Proclaimed bv U.S. President October 10, 1963
Entered into force October 10, 1963 •
The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the "Original Parties,"
Proclaiming as their principle aim the speediest possible achievement of an
agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in
accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the
armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds
of weapons, including nuclear weapons.
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons
for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end
to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not
to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any
place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water,
including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other enviroimient if such explosion cause radioactive debris to be
present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control
such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of
this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the
permanent barming of aU nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions
underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to
this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
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2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear
test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anys^'here which would take place in any
of the environments described, or to have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this
Article.
Article II
1. Any party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it
to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of
the Parties, the Depository shall convene a conference, to '(vhich they shall invite all the
Parties, to consider such amendment.
2, Any amendments to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes
of all Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all the Original Parties. The
amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of
ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of
all the Original Parties.
Article III
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does
not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this
Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be the subject of ratification by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the Original Parties - the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics - which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties
and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any
requests for conferences or other notices.
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6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercizing its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of
this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice
of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.
Article V
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall
be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of
this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of
the Signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this
Treaty.
DONE in triplicate at the city of iMoscow the fifth day of August, one thousand
nine hundred and sixty-three.
For the Government of the United States of America
DEAN RUSK
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
HOME




TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow May 2d, 1972
Ratification advised bv U.S. Senate August 3. 1972
Ratified bv U.S. President September 30, 197^
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3, 197Z
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences for all mankind.
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be
a substantial factor in curbing the arms race in strategic offensive arms and would lead
to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems,
as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive
arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further
negotiations on limiting strategic arms.
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of
the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic
arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to
adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the
territory of its country and not to provide a base for such defense, and not to deploy
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ABM s>'stems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III
of this Treaty.
Article II
For the Purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching
ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or
of a type tested in an ABM mode.





(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
Article III
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except
that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and
fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a party may deploy: (1) no
more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM
interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM
radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no
more than three kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius on one hundred
and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no
more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM
interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable
in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the
date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM
silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less
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\than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM
radars.
Article IV
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or
their components used for development or testing, and located within current or
additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen
ABM launchers at test ranges.
Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to
modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test,
or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of
ABM launchers.
Article VI
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and
their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode;
and
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and
oriented outward.
Article VII
Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement ofABM
systems or their components may be carried out.
Article VIII
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas
specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this
Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest
possible agreed period of time.
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Article IX
To assure the viability and efiectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not
to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM
systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Article X
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would
conflict with this Treaty.
Article XI
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic
offensive arms.
Article XII
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction,
assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article XIII
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty,
the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the
framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and
related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical
means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have bearing on the
provisions of the Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling ofABM
systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
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(0 consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability
of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions
of this Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting
strategic arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as
appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing
procedures, composition and other relevant matters.
Article XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments
shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force
of this Treaty.
Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals
thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.
Article XV
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercizing its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its
decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article XVI
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day
of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
L.I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
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APPENDIX D
INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972
Approval authorized bv U.S. Congress September 30, 1972
Approved by U.S. President September 3<J, 1972
Notices of acceptance exciianeed October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3,1972
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter refered to as the Parties,
Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions
for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of
international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
arms.
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based
intercontinental ballistic (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.
Article II
The Parties undertake not to convert Land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or
for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy
ICBMs of types deployed after that time.
Article III
The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
launchers and modem ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and
under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition
to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as
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replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of order types deployed prior to
1964 or for launchers on older submarines.
Article IV
Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and
replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missile launchers covered by this Interim
Agreement may be undertaken.
Article V
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of
this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of
this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article VI
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim
Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established
under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in
accordance with the provisions of that Article.
Article VII
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic
offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not
prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may
be worked out in the course of further negotiations.
Article VIII
1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices
of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the
exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems.
2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless
replaced eariier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic
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ofTensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on
negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It
shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from
this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
DONE at iMoscow on iMay 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
L.I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
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